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Abstract 
The aim of this paperwork is to describe part of the software development 
process of a product called Password Server. 
Password Server was developed by the author for ION Trading Ltd., 
market leader company in the field of software for finance. 
It is a solution to the problem of authentication over a distributed 
environment, applied to the world of financial trading. 
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1 Preface 
In this chapter an introduction to the problem of authenticating over a 
distributed environment will be given, along with brief recalls to cryptography. 
Finally, a general overview of the whole paperwork will be discussed. 
 
1.1 Assumptions 
The reader must be familiar with the concepts of distributed environment, 
meant as client/server based architecture, and with those of (Normalized) Data 
Base Systems. 
Further on in this section the basics of cryptography will be recalled. 
 
1.2 Overview 
In chapter 2, “State of the art”, the problem that Password Server solves 
will be described. A brief explanation of the ION’s proprietary MarketView 
platform  will be given, though the problem can be applied to a generic 
client/server distributed environment. 
Chapter 3, “System architecture”, describes in details the solution to the 
problem presented in chapter 1. 
The open points as well as the feasible future improvements to the system 
are described in Chapter 4, “Enhancements”. 
Chapter 5, “User Guide” is the User Guide of the product, more or less “as 
it is”. 
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1.3 Authentication 
Authentication meant as “identify oneself” is a very old problem. The 
history of mankind has seen many solutions to this problem, such as relying on 
guards, spoken passwords, hard-to-forge seals, key-operated mechanical locks 
and so on. 
With today’s computer based systems, unattended authentication with as 
little human interaction as possible is essential. 
 
1.3.1 Elements of an authentication system 
 
Regardless of whether an authentication system is computer based or not, 
there are several elements usually present, and certain things usually take 
place. 
First of all, we have a particular person or group of people (in general, an 
entity) to be authenticated. 
Next, we need a distinguishing characteristic that differentiates that 
particular person or group from others. 
Third, there is a proprietor who is responsible for the system being used 
and relies on mechanized authentication to distinguish authorized users from 
other people. 
Fourth, we need an authentication mechanism to verify the presence of the 
distinguishing characteristic. 
Fifth, we grant some privilege when the authentication succeeds by using 
an access control mechanism, and the same mechanism denies the privilege if 
authentication fails. 
The following table gives a few examples of these elements. 
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Element Password Login ATM Web Server 
Person, entity Authorized user Owner of a bank 
account 
Web site owner 
Distinguishing 
characteristic, 
token, 
authenticator 
Secret password ATM card and 
PIN 
Public key within 
a certificate 
Proprietor, 
system owner, 
administrator 
Enterprise owing 
the system 
Bank Certificate 
authority 
Authentication 
mechanism 
Password 
validation 
software 
Card validation 
software 
Certificate 
validation 
software 
Access control 
mechanism 
Login process, 
access controls 
Allows banking 
transactions 
Browser marks 
the page “secure” 
 
A genuine example is, of course, the password-controlled login operation 
we encounter in most computing environments. 
 
The person of interest is an individual allowed to use the computer. The 
system usually assigns the person a symbolic name or user identification code 
which we call the user name. For example, John Doe is an authorized user of 
the system, and the proprietor has assigned him the user name “jdoe”. 
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The distinguishing characteristic for John Doe is his secret password, 
“asdf”. 
The process should be familiar: John gets the computer’s attention and the 
computer’s login process prompts him for a user name and a password. 
The process contains an authentication procedure that compares the typed-
in password against the password established by or for John Doe; the procedure 
succeeds if the two match. 
The access control mechanism allows John to proceed with using the 
system, and the system uses John’s user name whenever it makes access 
control decisions on protected resources. 
Computer systems usually provide authentication and access control as 
clearly separate things. While it sometimes makes sense in the mechanical 
world to distinguish between the bolt that holds the door shut and the lock that 
controls the bolt, such things are often built into a single mechanism. On 
computers, the authentication process establishes the correct user name to use, 
and access control happens separately. 
Computer systems generally control access by comparing the person’s user 
name with the access rules tied to a particular file or other resource. If the rule 
grant access by the person with that user name, then the person gets to use the 
resource. 
We have a similar problem in access control: we want to authorize certain 
people to use the system, and we implement those desires by setting up the 
access control system to allow this. 
In an ideal security engineering world, we grant access using the principle 
of least privilege," in which people have just as many permissions and 
privileges as they need: no more, no less. But in the real world, the access 
control system can't give people exactly the privileges they need: we must 
either give them too many or omit a few that they really need. In a practical 
world we usually extend a measure of trust to authorized users so that they 
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have the tools to get their work done, even though this technically gives them 
permission to do things they shouldn't be doing. 
Access control can be very complex, even without trying to achieve least 
privilege. Modern computing systems provide a broad range of access control 
policies and mechanisms. Even the access control mechanisms provided by 
relatively common systems like Unix, Windows NT, or Windows 2000 allow 
users and administrators to establish very complicated sets of rules for granting 
or denying the use of various computer resources. However, many 
organizations take the relatively simple approach of tying access control and 
authentication together, so that authenticated users have only a few broad 
access restrictions. 
Although the problem of authenticating people poses a real challenge to 
computer systems, they aren't the only entities we need to authenticate. We 
also need to authenticate unattended computer systems like Web servers, 
especially when we ask them to perform an expensive service. Unlike user 
authentication, there isn't really a person standing at the server for us to 
authenticate. Instead, we want to ensure that we speak to the right piece of 
equipment under the control of the right people or enterprise. We don't want to 
order boots from a computer claiming to be "L. L. Bean" unless we will receive 
the boots. When we authenticate L. L. Bean's server, we need confidence that its 
distinguishing characteristic is managed and controlled by the L. L. Bean 
enterprise. Usually, the browser warns its operator if it can't authenticate the 
site, and leaves the access control decision to the operator ("Should I still order 
boots, even though this site doesn't really seem to be L. L. Bean? I don't think 
so!"). In a sense, the process turns the automatic authentication function 
upside-down, but the underlying concepts are still the same. 
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1.3.2  Attacks and defences 
Today's authentication systems evolved from decades of attacks, many of 
them successful. Starting with password systems in the early days of 
timesharing, authentication systems have been under constant attack. 
The earliest attacks were from members of the local user community 
protesting against the notion of authentication and access control. 
Early success at stealing password files led to a defensive measure called 
password hashing. 
This led to attempts to intercept (“sniff”) passwords, which in turn led to 
other defensive measures. The following figure illustrates the general 
progression of increasingly sophisticated defenses in response to increasingly 
sophisticated attacks. 
 
 
 
While the figure doesn't represent an accurate historical time line, it 
accurately captures the dynamics of an ongoing competition between proprietors 
and attackers. Later on these attacks and defenses will be described in detail. 
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1.3.2.1 Masquerade 
In the early 60s the problem of authentication on a time-sharing system 
was solved by Fernando J. Corbato’ at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology). 
The main server had to be accessed by a group of authorized people 
(mainly students) whose programs borrowed CPU time from it. 
Each student had to be identified by the system unambiguously. This was 
done by assigning each user of the system (student) a unique username. 
Of course, nothing prevented each user from typing in another user’s 
username: these were the early attempt of masquerade attack. 
In a masquerade attack a user pretends to be someone else, cheating on the 
Authentication System by the bare knowledge of the distinguishing 
characteristic of another user (the username). 
The weakness of this Authentication System resides in the fact that the 
distinguishing characteristic (the username) is a well-known fact among the 
group of users of the system. 
 
The solution Corbato’ gave to this problem in 1963 was the association of 
a private secret code (a password) to each user. The password was known by 
the user only, and let them be authenticated without risks of masquerade 
attacks, as both the username and the password were required in order for a 
user to be authenticated by the Authentication System. 
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1.3.2.2 Password File Theft 
In 1967, Cambridge University started running their Titan time-sharing 
system on a continuous basis in order to provide a reliable, full-time computing 
service to the university community. Even in 1967, people knew it was 
essential to make back-up copies of files to protect against disasters. But these 
back-up tapes posed a security dilemma, since they held copies of Titan's 
password file. 
One evening, Roger Needham was sharing a few pints with another Titan 
developer, Mike Guy, and discussing the vulnerability of password files stored 
on back-up tapes. They struck on the notion of encrypting the passwords using 
a "one-way cipher" that would disguise the passwords in an irreversible way. 
The procedure converted a text password into an undecipherable series of bits 
that attackers couldn't easily convert back into the password's text. Mike coded 
up the one-way function and they installed the revised logon mechanism. 
One-way functions are depressingly common in real life: it takes moments 
to injure or break something, but it can take hours or weeks to make it whole 
again, or stacks of money to replace it with a new copy. Automobile accidents 
provide an extreme case: it takes a lot of time, money, and material to build a 
new car, but it takes only a moment to "total" that car in a crash. Mathematics 
provides similar functions: we can easily combine numbers in various ways. 
But it might be difficult or impossible to figure out what numbers we started 
with. 
The function that Guy and Needham installed in Titan is today called a 
one-way hash. The figure below shows how we use it with passwords. When 
John Doe logs on, he types his user name and pass-word as usual, and they're 
read into RAM. Next, the system applies the one-way hash procedure to his 
password. Then the system extract's John's entry from the password file on the 
system's hard drive. The password entry contains a copy of John's password as 
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it appears after applying the one-way hash procedure. If John typed the right 
password, the hashed copy should match the copy in the password file. 
The one-way hash thwarts the objective of stealing the password file from 
the back-up tape (or from anywhere else), since attackers can't retrieve users' 
passwords simply by looking at the stolen pass-word file. The technique is still 
used today: every modern server system stores passwords in hashed form. 
Password hashing has become an essential defense in any system that uses 
passwords. 
 
 
 
A good one-way hash function has two properties. First, the function must 
compute a result (the hash) that depends on all of the input data. The hash 
result should be different, and often wildly different, whenever we make minor 
changes to its input. Second, there must be no practical way to convert the hash 
result back into the original data. Since the function accepts an arbitrarily large 
amount of input data and yields a fixed amount of output, it's going to be 
possible to generate the same output to two different hash results. Even so, 
there should be no easy way to find the input data that yields a particular hash 
result. 
In fact, there should be no way to produce a particular result from a one-
way hash function except by trying all possible input values until the desired 
hash result appears. Encryption procedures have a similar property: there 
should be no simple way to deduce the original plaintext data from the 
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encrypted data unless one knows what encryption key was used. However, 
encryption procedures are designed to be reversible, and that's why they use a 
key. We don't need to reverse the password hashing and, in fact, the passwords 
are safer that way. 
A system that uses hashed passwords must perform the hash whenever 
someone enters a password into the system. First, the system hashes the initial 
password assigned to the user before storing it in the password file. Then every 
procedure on the system that collects a password from the user must hash it 
before doing any-thing further. The login procedure hashes the password 
before comparing it against the password file. The password changing 
procedure hashes the old password to authenticate the user before allowing the 
password to change, and then hashes the new pass-word before storing it in the 
password file. 
Many timesharing designers adopted password hashing over the next 
several years. Developers at MIT used the technique in the ambitious follow-on 
system to CTSS known as Multics, the "Multiplexed Information and 
Computing Service." However, the Multics experience illustrated the 
importance of using a good hash function. In the early 1970s, the U.S. Air Force 
began "Project ZARF," which probed the security of the early Multics system. 
The Air Force team quickly penetrated Multics file protection and stole a copy 
of the password file. After examining the hash function it used, they found a way 
to invert it. At a subsequent meeting with the Multics developers, the ZARF 
team presented a slip of paper to the author of the password software, and he 
found his password written on it. The security problems were largely cleared up 
in subsequent versions of Multics and, in time, it developed one of the best 
reputations in the community for operating system security. 
1.3.2.3 Sniffing attacks 
The following figure shows a classic sniffing attack associated with 
timesharing systems, like the RAX system. When people logged in, the system 
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copied the user name and password into a special area of RAM called the 
keyboard input buffer. The password checking procedure compared the data in 
the input buffer against the password stored on the RAX hard drive and logged 
the user on if the password matched. Meanwhile, however, another user on the 
RAX system could run a "sniffer" program that copied information out of the 
key-board input buffer as people typed. The attacker watched the typed 
information especially closely when people logged on, since both the user name 
and the password would promptly show up in the input buffer. 
 
Although the RAX system at the time did not implement any form of 
password hashing or encryption, such a mechanism would not have protected 
against this attack. The keyboard input procedure had to read the entire 
password into RAM without hashing it first. RAX ran on an IBM mainframe 
(the IBM 360 family) and the IBM computer hardware put restrictions on how 
data was exchanged with peripheral devices like keyboards. In particular, the 
keyboard input procedure was written as a "channel program" that could only 
read a full line of text at a time from a keyboard. Whenever a user typed a 
password, the channel program had to read the entire line of text containing the 
password directly into RAM. There was no way for the RAX software to 
disguise the password before it was stored in RAM in a sniffable form. 
Instead, the attack was blocked by changing the RAX system to restrict use 
of the keyboard input buffer. The IBM mainframe included memory protection 
features that RAX already used to keep user programs from accidentally writing 
information into other people's keyboard input buffers or from damaging other 
Chapter 1  Preface 
 19
system data in RAM. The software was changed so that only the RAX system 
soft-ware itself was allowed to see the contents of people's keyboard input 
buffers. When the attacker's sniffer program attempted to read data from 
someone's buffer, the mainframe hardware blocked the attempt, generated a 
signal, and RAX aborted the sniffer pro-gram. 
Modern systems can be vulnerable to the same threat and usually solve it 
the same way. The hardware protections provided on classic IBM mainframes 
are standard equipment on state-of-the-art micro-processors like the PowerPC 
and the Pentium. Sophisticated operating systems like Unix, Mac OS X, 
Windows NT, and Windows 2000 protect keyboard input buffers from sniffing. 
Unfortunately, traditional desktop systems like Windows 95 or 98, and 
single-user Macintosh systems, rarely make use of hardware protection 
mechanisms. Sniffers designed for single-user systems usually save the 
password information in a file or transmit it across a network to another 
computer. Sniffer programs targeting those systems are common features in 
collections of hacker tools. Well-known sniffers in the Windows environment 
include "keycopy," "playback," and "keytrap." Sniffer software poses a very 
real threat in academic and educational settings where roomfuls of personal 
workstations are shared among many students and occasionally with 
administrators. 
Not all sniffer problems are hacker based. In an attempt to pre-vent 
computer misuse by employees, several organizations use key-stroke monitor 
software. This software works almost exactly like a sniffer except that it 
collects every keystroke. This allows managers to review employee activities 
and identify employees that indulge in personal or recreational activities on 
company time or equipment. Unfortunately, any employee that looks at the 
keystroke monitor logs will be able to retrieve passwords of monitored 
employees. This makes the logs even more sensitive than system password 
files, since modern password files are usually hashed. Keystroke monitoring 
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poses a dilemma wherever passwords are used, since managers must choose 
between monitoring and the reliable authentication of employees. 
Just as timesharing and other forms of distributed computing brought the 
need for authentication and passwords, it also produced some new threats as 
computing became even more distributed. As connections became more 
widespread and systems were used for more and more important tasks, sites 
had to contend with sniffing threats on their communications lines. Matters got 
even worse with the evolution of the Internet. 
In early 1994, network news broadcasts made an unprecedented 
announcement: All computer users on the Internet should change their 
passwords. The announcement was triggered by a notorious sniffing incident: a 
centrally located Internet service had been penetrated and an attacker had 
installed unattended sniffer programs to collect passwords from the user traffic 
passing through it. Further investigations found sniffer programs in many other 
Internet sites. Investigators estimated that at least 100,000 passwords were 
collected by the sniffers they found. 
The evening news recommendation reflects a major advantage of 
passwords — if the user thinks the password has been stolen, it is relatively 
easy to block the attacker from exploiting the stolen one by replacing it with a 
new one. This is another essential defense: every password system must have a 
mechanism to allow users to change their passwords easily. 
1.4 Cryptography 
As mentioned before, the assumption that the reader is familiar with the 
concepts of cryptography is made. Some brief recalls to the basic concepts of 
cryptography will be made though. 
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1.4.1 Goals of Cryptography 
The primary goal of cryptography is to secure important data as it passes 
through a medium that may not be secure itself. Usually, that medium is a 
computer network. 
There are many different cryptographic algorithms, each of which can 
provide one or more of the following services to applications: 
Confidentiality (secrecy) 
Data is kept secret from those without the proper credentials, even if that 
data travels through an insecure medium. In practice, this means potential 
attackers might be able to see garbled data that is essentially "locked," but they 
should not be able to unlock that data without the proper information. In classic 
cryptography, the encryption (scrambling) algorithm was the secret. In modern 
cryptography, that isn't feasible. 
The algorithms are public, and cryptographic keys are used in the 
encryption and decryption processes. The only thing that needs to be secret is 
the key. In addition, as we will demonstrate a bit later, there are common cases 
in which not all keys need to be kept secret. 
Integrity (anti-tampering) 
The basic idea behind data integrity is that there should be a way for the 
recipient of a piece of data to determine whether any modifications are made 
over a period of time. For example, integrity checks can be used to make sure 
that data sent over a wire isn't modified in transit. Plenty of well-known 
checksums exist that can detect and even correct simple errors. However, such 
checksums are poor at detecting skilled intentional modifications of the data. 
Several cryptographic checksums do not have these drawbacks if used 
properly. Note that encryption does not ensure data integrity. Entire classes of 
encryption algorithms are subject to "bit-flipping" attacks. That is, an attacker 
can change the actual value of a bit of data by changing the corresponding 
encrypted bit of data. 
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Authentication 
Cryptography can help establish identity for authentication purposes. 
Non-repudiation 
Cryptography can enable Bob to prove that a message he received from 
Alice actually came from Alice. Alice can essentially be held accountable 
when she sends Bob such a message, as she cannot deny (repudiate) that she 
sent it. In the real world, you have to assume that an attacker does not 
compromise particular cryptographic keys. The SSL protocol does not support 
non-repudiation, but it is easily added by using digital signatures. 
These simple services can be used to stop a wide variety of network 
attacks, including: 
Snooping (passive eavesdropping) 
An attacker watches network traffic as it passes and records interesting 
data, such as credit card information. 
Tampering 
An attacker monitors network traffic and maliciously changes data in 
transit (for example, an attacker may modify the contents of an email message). 
Spoofing 
An attacker forges network data, appearing to come from a different 
network address than he actually comes from. This sort of attack can be used to 
thwart systems that authenticate based on host information (e.g., an IP 
address). 
Hijacking 
Once a legitimate user authenticates, a spoofing attack can be used to 
"hijack" the connection. 
Capture-replay 
In some circumstances, an attacker can record and replay network 
transactions to ill effect. 
For example, say that you sell a single share of stock while the price is 
high. If the network protocol is not properly designed and secured, an attacker 
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could record that transaction, then replay it later when the stock price has 
dropped, and do so repeatedly until all your stock is gone. 
Many people assume that some (or all) of the above attacks aren't actually 
feasible in practice. 
However, that's far from the truth. Especially due to tool sets such as dsniff 
(http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/), it doesn't even take much 
experience to launch all of the above attacks if access to any node on a network 
between the two endpoints is available. 
Attacks are equally easy if you're on the same local network as one of the 
endpoints. Talented high school students who can use other people's software 
to break into machines and manipulate them can easily manage to use these 
tools to attack real systems. 
Traditionally, network protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, FTP, NNTP, and 
Telnet don't provide adequate defenses to the above attacks. Before electronic 
commerce started taking off in mid-1990, security wasn't really a large 
concern, especially considering the Internet's origins as a platform for sharing 
academic research and resources. While many protocols provided some sort of 
authentication in the way of password-based logins, most of them did not 
address confidentiality or integrity at all. As a result, all of the above attacks 
were possible. 
Moreover, authentication information could usually be among the 
information "snooped" off a network. SSL is a great boon to the traditional 
network protocols, because it makes it easy to add transparent confidentiality 
and integrity services to an otherwise insecure TCP-based protocol. It can also 
provide authentication services, the most important being that clients can 
determine if they are talking to the intended server, not some attacker that is 
spoofing the server. 
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1.4.2 Cryptographic Algorithms 
The SSL protocol covers many cryptographic needs. Sometimes, though, it 
isn't good enough. For example, you may wish to encrypt HTTP cookies that 
will be placed on an end user's browser. 
SSL won't help protect the cookies while they're being stored on that disk. 
For situations like this, OpenSSL exports the underlying cryptographic 
algorithms used in its implementation of the SSL protocol. 
Generally, you should avoid using cryptographic algorithms directly if 
possible. You're not likely to get a totally secure system simply by picking an 
algorithm and applying it. Usually, cryptographic algorithms are incorporated 
into cryptographic protocols. Plenty of nonobvious things can be wrong with a 
protocol based on cryptographic algorithms. That is why it's better to try to find 
a well-known cryptographic protocol to do what you want to do, instead of 
inventing something yourself. In fact, even the protocols invented by 
cryptographers often have subtle holes. 
If not for public review, most protocols in use would be insecure. Consider 
the original WEP protocol for IEEE 802.11 wireless networking. WEP (Wired 
Equivalent Privacy) is the protocol that is supposed to provide the same level 
of security for data that physical lines provide. It is a challenge, because data is 
transmitted through the air, instead of across a wire. WEP was designed by 
veteran programmers, yet without soliciting the opinions of any professional 
cryptographers or security protocol developers. Although to a seasoned 
developer with moderate security knowledge the protocol looked fine, in 
reality, it was totally lacking in security. 
Nonetheless, sometimes you might find a protocol that does what you 
need, but can't find an implementation that suits your needs. Alternatively, you 
might find that you do need to come up with your own protocol. For those 
cases, we do document the SSL cryptographic API. 
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Five types of cryptographic algorithms are discussed in this book: 
symmetric key encryption, public key encryption, cryptographic hash 
functions, message authentication codes, and digital signatures. 
 
1.4.2.1 Symmetric key encryption 
Symmetric key algorithms encrypt and decrypt data using a single key. As 
shown in the figure below, the key and the plaintext message are passed to the 
encryption algorithm, producing ciphertext. 
 
 
 
The result can be sent across an insecure medium, allowing only a 
recipient who has the original key to decrypt the message, which is done by 
passing the ciphertext and the key to a decryption algorithm. Obviously, the 
key must remain secret for this scheme to be effective. 
The primary disadvantage of symmetric key algorithms is that the key 
must remain secret at all times. In particular, exchanging secret keys can be 
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difficult, since you'll usually want to exchange keys on the same medium that 
you're trying to use encryption to protect. Sending the key in the clear before 
you use it leaves open the possibility of an attacker recording the key before 
you even begin to send data. 
One solution to the key distribution problem is to use a cryptographic key 
exchange protocol. 
OpenSSL provides the Diffie-Hellman protocol for this purpose, which 
allows for key agreement without actually divulging the key on the network. 
However, Diffie-Hellman does not guarantee the identity of the party with 
whom you are exchanging keys. Some sort of authentication mechanism is 
necessary to ensure that you don't accidentally exchange keys with an attacker. 
Right now, Triple DES (usually written 3DES, or sometimes DES3) is the 
most conservative symmetric cipher available. It is in wide use, but AES, the 
new Advanced Encryption Standard, will eventually replace it as the most 
widely used cipher. AES is certainly faster than 3DES, but 3DES has been 
around a lot longer, and thus is a more conservative choice for the ultra-
paranoid. 
It is worth mentioning that RC4 is widely supported by existing clients and 
servers. It is faster than 3DES, but is difficult to set up properly (don't worry, 
SSL uses RC4 properly). For purposes of compatibility with existing software 
in which neither AES nor 3DES are supported, RC4 is of particular interest. 
We don't recommend supporting other algorithms without a good reason. 
Security is related to the length of the key. Longer key lengths are, of 
course, better. To ensure security, you should only use key lengths of 80 bits or 
higher. While 64-bit keys may be secure, they likely will not be for long, 
whereas 80-bit keys should be secure for at least a few years to come. AES 
supports only 128-bit keys and higher, while 3DES has a fixed 112 bits of 
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effective security1. Both of these should be secure for all cryptographic needs 
for the foreseeable future. 
Larger keys are probably unnecessary. Key lengths of 56 bits (regular 
DES) or less (40-bit keys 
are common) are too weak; they have proven to be breakable with a 
modest amount of time and 
effort. 
1.4.2.2 Public key encryption 
Public key cryptography suggests a solution to the key distribution 
problem that plagues symmetric cryptography. In the most popular form of 
public key cryptography, each party has two keys, one that must remain secret 
(the private key) and one that can be freely distributed (the public key). 
The two keys have a special mathematical relationship. For Alice to send a 
message to Bob using public key encryption (see figure below), Alice must 
first have Bob's public key. She then encrypts her message using Bob's public 
key, and delivers it. Once encrypted, only someone who has Bob's private key 
can successfully decrypt the message (hopefully, that's only Bob). 
                                                 
1 3DES provides 168 bits of security against brute-force attacks, but there 
is an attack that reduces the effective security to 112 bits. The enormous space 
requirements for that attack makes it about as practical as brute force (which is 
completely impractical in and of itself). 
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Public key encryption solves the problem of key distribution, assuming 
there is some way to find Bob's public key and ensure that the key really does 
belong to Bob. In practice, public keys are passed around with a bunch of 
supporting information called a certificate, and those certificates are validated 
by trusted third parties. Often, a trusted third party is an organization that does 
research (such as credit checks) on people who wish to have their certificates 
validated. SSL uses trusted third parties to help address the key distribution 
problem. 
Public key cryptography has a significant drawback, though: it is 
intolerably slow for large messages. Symmetric key cryptography can usually 
be done quickly enough to encrypt and decrypt all the network traffic a 
machine can manage. Public key cryptography is generally limited by the 
speed of the cryptography, not the bandwidth going into the computer, 
particularly on server machines that need to handle multiple connections 
simultaneously. 
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As a result, most systems that use public key cryptography, SSL included, 
use it as little as possible. Generally, public key encryption is used to agree on 
an encryption key for a symmetric algorithm, and then all further encryption is 
done using the symmetric algorithm. Therefore, public key encryption 
algorithms are primarily used in key exchange protocols and when 
nonrepudiation is required. 
RSA is the most popular public key encryption algorithm. The Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol is based on public key technology and can be 
used to achieve the same ends by exchanging a symmetric key, which is used 
to perform actual data encryption and decryption. For public key schemes to be 
effective, there usually needs to be an authentication mechanism involving a 
trusted third party that is separate from the encryption itself. Most often, digital 
signature schemes, which we discuss below, provide the necessary 
authentication. 
Keys in public key algorithms are essentially large numbers with particular 
properties. Therefore, bit length of keys in public key ciphers aren't directly 
comparable to symmetric algorithms. With public key encryption algorithms, 
you should use keys of 1,024 bits or more to ensure reasonable security. 512-
bit keys are probably too weak. Anything larger than 2,048 bits may be too 
slow, and chances are it will not buy security that is much more practical. 
Recently, there's been some concern that 1,024-bit keys are too weak, but as of 
this writing, there hasn't been conclusive proof. 
Certainly, 1,024 bits is a bare minimum for practical security from short-
term attacks. If your keys potentially need to stay protected for years, then you 
might want to go ahead and use 2,048-bit keys. 
When selecting key lengths for public key algorithms, you'll usually need 
to select symmetric key lengths as well. Recommendations vary, but we 
recommend using 1,024-bit keys when you are willing to work with symmetric 
keys that are less than 100 bits in length. If you're using 3DES or 128-bit keys, 
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we recommend 2,048-bit public keys. If you are paranoid enough to be using 
192-bit keys or higher, we recommend using 4,096-bit public keys. 
Requirements for key lengths change if you're using elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC), which is a modification of public key cryptography that 
can provide the same amount of security using faster operations and smaller 
keys. OpenSSL currently doesn't support ECC, and there may be some 
lingering patent issues for those who wish to use it. For developers interested in 
this topic, we recommend the book Implementing Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 
by Michael Rosing (Manning). 
1.4.2.3 Cryptographic hash functions and Message 
Authentication Codes 
Cryptographic hash functions are essentially checksum algorithms with 
special properties. You pass data to the hash function, and it outputs a fixed-
size checksum, often called a message digest, or simply digest for short. 
Passing identical data into the hash function twice will always yield identical 
results. However, the result gives away no information about the data input to 
the function. Additionally, it should be practically impossible to find two 
inputs that produce the same message digest. Generally, when we discuss such 
functions, we are talking about one-way functions. That is, it should not be 
possible to take the output and algorithmically reconstruct the input under any 
circumstances. There are certainly reversible hash functions, but we do not 
consider such things in the scope of this paperwork. 
For general-purpose usage, a minimally secure cryptographic hash 
algorithm should have a digest twice as large as a minimally secure symmetric 
key algorithm. MD5 and SHA1 are the most popular one-way cryptographic 
hash functions. MD5's digest length is only 128 bits, whereas SHA1's is 160 
bits. For some uses, MD5's key length is suitable, and for others, it is risky. To 
be safe, we recommend using only cryptographic hash algorithms that yield 
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160-bit digests or larger, unless you need to support legacy algorithms. In 
addition, MD5 is widely considered "nearly broken" due to some cryptographic 
weaknesses in part of the algorithm. Therefore, we recommend that you avoid 
using MD5 in any new applications. 
Cryptographic hash functions have been put to many uses. They are 
frequently used as part of a password storage solution. In such circumstances, 
logins are checked by running the hash function over the password and some 
additional data, and checking it against a stored value. That way, the server 
doesn't have to store the actual password, so a well-chosen password will be 
safe even if an attacker manages to get a hold of the password database. 
Another thing people like to do with cryptographic hashes is to release 
them alongside a software release. For example, OpenSSL might be released 
alongside a MD5 checksum of the archive. 
When you download the archive, you can also download the checksum. 
Then you can compute the checksum over the archive and see if the computed 
checksum matches the downloaded checksum. 
You might hope that if the two checksums match, then you securely 
downloaded the actual released file, and did not get some modified version 
with a Trojan horse in it. Unfortunately, that isn't the case, because there is no 
secret involved. An attacker can replace the archive with a modified version, 
and replace the checksum with a valid value. This is possible because the 
message digest algorithm is public, and there is no secret information input to 
it. 
If you share a secret key with the software distributor, then the distributor 
could combine the archive with the secret key to produce a message digest that 
an attacker shouldn't be able to forge, since he wouldn't have the secret. 
Schemes for using keyed hashes, i.e., hashes involving a secret key, are called 
Message Authentication Codes (MACs). MACs are often used to provide 
message integrity for general-purpose data transfer, whether encrypted or not. 
Indeed, SSL uses MACs for this purpose. 
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The most widely used MAC, and the only one currently supported in SSL 
and in OpenSSL, is HMAC. HMAC can be used with any message digest 
algorithm. 
1.4.2.4 Digital signatures 
For many applications, MACs are not very useful, because they require 
agreeing on a shared secret. It would be nice to be able to authenticate 
messages without needing to share a secret. Public key cryptography makes 
this possible. If Alice signs a message with her secret signing key, then anyone 
can use her public key to verify that she signed the message. RSA provides for 
digital signing. Essentially, the public key and private key are interchangeable. 
If Alice encrypts a message with her private key, anyone can decrypt it. If 
Alice didn't encrypt the message, using her public key to decrypt the message 
would result in garbage. 
There is also a popular scheme called DSA (the Digital Signature 
Algorithm), which the SSL protocol and the OpenSSL library both support. 
Much like public key encryption, digital signatures are very slow. To speed 
things up, the algorithm generally doesn't operate on the entire message to be 
signed. Instead, the message is cryptographically hashed, and then the hash of 
the message is signed. Nonetheless, signature schemes are still expensive. For 
this reason, MACs are preferable if any sort of secure key exchange has taken 
place. 
One place where digital signatures are widely used is in certificate 
management. If Alice is willing to validate Bob's certificate, she can sign it 
with her private key. Once she's done that, Bob can attach her signature to his 
certificate. Now, let's say he gives the certificate to Charlie, and Charlie does 
not know that Bob actually gave him the certificate, but he would believe Alice 
if she told him the certificate belonged to Bob. In this case, Charlie can validate 
Alice's signature, thereby demonstrating that the certificate does indeed belong 
to Bob. 
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Since digital signatures are a form of public key cryptography, you should 
be sure to use key lengths of 1,024 bits or higher to ensure security. 
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2 The platform 
In this chapter a brief explanation of the ION’s proprietary MarketView 
platform will be given, though the problem can be applied to a generic 
client/server distributed environment. 
Also, it contains a detailed description of “how things worked” before the 
introduction of the Password Server. 
 
2.1 The basics 
MarketView is ION Trading’s proprietary platform for data distribution. 
The platform follows a publisher/subscriber pattern. 
A running instance of the platform can be considered a “pool” in which a 
virtually unlimited number of components “float”. 
A component corresponds to a process running on a machine connected to 
the platform. 
The “special” component that holds information about all the components 
connected to the platform is called Configuration Server (CS). The 
Configuration Server is itself a process running on some machine, which all the 
other components willing to participate to the platform must refer to. There 
must be exactly one Configuration Server for each platform – actually a 
platform can be identified with the configuration server itself. 
In fact there’s no strict distinction between clients and servers. Instead, the 
distinction is made on a data basis. 
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Every component can publish a specific piece of data, or subscribe it. So, 
there are publishers and subscribers of data. A piece of data can be published 
by one component and subscribed by many components. A component that 
publishes one piece of data can subscribe other data as well. So a component 
can be both a publisher and a subscriber. 
In order for a component to be able to publish and/or subscribe data, that 
component must create a connection with another component. A connection 
can be seen as a link between two components, on which the data that the two 
components exchange flow. A connection can be unidirectional or 
bidirectional, and has exactly one component as a proprietor (that is, the 
initiator of the connection). 
From a high-level point of view, the data on the connection flows only 
“when needed”. In fact, only control messages are exchanged when a publisher 
publishes data, the real data being sent only when the subscribe message from 
the subscriber is received by the publisher. 
Once a connection is established, data can start flowing on it. In order for 
two components to be able to communicate, one of the following must occur: 
• there is a direct connection between the two components; 
• there is a path of connections between the two components, through 
a certain number of special components called routers. 
Particular attention must be given to the difference between the “high level 
connection” that can be created between two components – on which the 
published/subscribed data flows – and the “control connection” that every 
component must have with the Configuration Server – on which control 
information is exchanged. 
The former can be created or destroyed at any time by the user, and there 
can be a large number of them (up to the number of free ports on the machine 
the process is running). The data flowing on it relies on the 
publisher/subscribed mechanism. 
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The latter is automatically created by the platform, and the data flowing on 
it is control information needed by the Configuration Server in order for all the 
platform to “see” the component. 
A brief description of some kinds of components will be given below. 
 
2.1.1 Gateway 
A gateway is a component that communicates with another machine 
outside of the platform (“the market”). It retrieves data from the market and 
publishes formatted data on the platform, so that every other component 
participating to the platform – and connected to that gateway – can use the 
data. 
The aim of the gateway is to format the data retrieved by the market, and to 
forward to the market all the requests coming from the platform. 
 
2.1.2 Client 
End users (traders) can manipulate the data on the platform using a graphic 
application called client. 
The data can be displayed on spreadsheets and grids, formatted and 
filtered. 
Also, requests such as placing an order or modifying a price are sent to 
gateways by clients. 
The advanced GUI that can be launched by a client is named Multi Market 
Interface (MMI). The data can be manipulated from a higher-level point of 
view by MMI: complex algorithms are applied to sets of records (the record 
being the unit of the data), as well as real-time visualization. 
 
  
Chapter 2  The platform 
 37
2.1.3 Router 
A router works just as a hardware router: it receives data and, according to 
some rules, it forwards the data to certain destinations (such as a gateway, a 
client or another router). 
The rules on the basis of which a router operates can be configured via its 
configuration file. 
 
2.1.4 System Administrator 
The IT personnel of a company using MarketView can manage all the 
components on a platform via a System Administrator. 
This is a graphical application that displays all the components running on 
a platform as icons, and the connections among them as arcs. 
Also, components can be easily started/stopped and connections among 
them can be created visually. 
 
2.2 Security issues 
Authentication occurs at different stages on the platform. Some relevant 
cases will be illustrated below. 
 
2.2.1 Authentication of a component to the platform 
Every component automatically authenticates to the Configuration Server 
at its start-up. 
A failure of authentication at this stage results in that component’s 
unavailability for any kind of data transmission on the platform. 
The data for authentication (a username and a password) is kept in the 
configuration file of the component, in clear. The configuration file is usually 
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held in some file-system (the component’s working directory) that the IT 
personnel only can access. 
Authentication data is sent encrypted via the control connection to the 
Configuration Server. The symmetric key is hard-coded and it is the same for 
all the components of the platform. Also, it is unique for all instances of the 
platform, and it doesn’t change with the time. 
 
2.2.2 Authentication of a client to a gateway 
When a client starts, after authenticating to the Configuration Server, it is 
ready to subscribe all the data published by the gateways it is connected to. 
This lets traders use the data in a read-only mode though. 
All the active actions – such as placing orders, modifying prices, sending 
proposals and so on – require a login to the gateway first. 
This login takes place sending a username and a password to the gateway. 
Both the username and the password are sent in the clear to the gateway, 
through the connection (or the path of connections) that there is between the 
client and the gateway itself. 
Also, the authentication data resides in the working directory of the client, 
stored in a script configuration file of the client, in a hashed way. 
The symmetric key used for this hash is the same as the one used for 
sending the username and the password to the Configuration Server. 
Failure at this stage of login results in the traders restriction of usage of the 
data published on the platform in a read-only fashion. 
 
2.2.3 Authentication of a gateway to a market 
Each gateway is connected with the market (a machine outside of the 
platform) via some connection. Every market has its own rules for the 
authentication. 
  
Chapter 2  The platform 
 39
Anyways, the password is changed by the market almost every day (one-
time password) and it is generally sent by the gateway in the clear. 
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3 System Architecture 
3.1 System Functional Specification 
3.1.1 General Description 
The Password Server Repository is a specific component that deals with the 
management of all accounting data needed by MarketView users to access the platform 
itself and the provided services (e.g. access to the markets). 
The Password Server authentication mechanism is based on the Single Sign On 
paradigm, whereby a single action of user authentication and authorization can permit a 
user to access all computers and systems where he has access permission, without the 
need to enter multiple passwords. 
The data are thus centralized within the platform and accessible from all the 
connected MMI front ends. Users needs only to log to the platforms and their related 
accounting data are automatically acquired by the MMI in order to be used at a later time 
for accessing the different markets (through relevant gateways). 
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3.1.2 User Authentication 
According to the adopted approach, the MMI front end, in order to access the 
platform, needs first to be registered by the Configuration Server. To this aim the MMI 
front end performs, once started, an automatic login, transparent to the user, to the 
Configuration Server by using the user name and password specified in the mkv.init file 
stored in the client machine. 
In order to access the market/services the user needs then to be authenticated by the 
Password Server (PS). 
Upon receipt of the login request issued by the MMI client, the Password Server 
performs all the checks required: 
• the account has not been disabled 
• the password matches 
• the maximum number of allowed active session for that user is not exceeded 
(default 1 active session per user) 
If the login is successfully executed and the Password Server authenticates the user, 
it returns to the MMI front end the following information: 
• the authentication return status (successful or unsuccessful login) 
Login
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Registration
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• User Profile record 
• market/service accounts associated wit the user 
The User Profile field defines the privileges associated with the user. Two default 
basic roles are defined in the system: Administrator and Trader, where the Administrator 
has full read/write access to PS data and the Trader has read only access rights apart 
from the change password ability. 
A Service Account record is returned for each service/market the user is 
configured to be accessed by the trader. 
A Service Account, record is made up of: 
• Service identifier 
• User Name 
• Password 
The MMI front end uses the Service Account record list for accessing the required 
services/markets. Once the Password Server has authorized the access, the MMI is able 
to perform the login (both automatic or manual) to the market/services. 
 
3.1.3 Accounting Data Administration 
Accounting data are stored in a database accessed by the Password Server 
application. Through Password Sever, application users with appropriate privileges are 
able to manage accounting data. At system initialization one pre-defined user is present 
in the database. This user has administrator profile (see 3.3.1) but no associated 
password. In this state the system refuses any other access by any user different from the 
Administrator. 
The Administrator user has no rights to perform any operation apart from setting the 
password. Once the password is set the user gains all the authorizations associated with 
the predefined Administrator profile. 
The accounting data are managed by the System Administrator Tool. 
3.1.3.1 User Profile (Roles) 
A user profile is a list of attributes assigned to users for accessing the Password 
Server. 
From a data-access point of view, the most important attribute in a User Profile is 
the Role. The basic set of Roles includes: 
• Administrator  
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• Trader 
Where the Administrator is able to create/modify/delete: 
• User Accounts data (e.g. UserName, Password, Personal Info), 
• Service Accounts data (e.g. Market Password), 
• User Roles 
Traders, apart from login and logout, are only able to change their own password 
and (transparently to the user) are able to read and forward services accounts to the 
electronic markets when they are logged in. 
3.1.3.2 Logging and Reporting 
Every access to the Password Server is logged into a specified file. The name of 
the file is defined into the Password Server configuration file. The log records are 
reported in ASCII format so that the file can be read and printed out. Only System 
Administrator has the right to access the file. 
Moreover, the used format of log file is suitable for being then read by the Explorer 
ION diagnostic tool. 
The Administrator is able to produce a reporting of all the User Main Accounts 
present in the system. 
Upon user request, the Password Server, by accessing the DB, retrieve all the 
stored Main User Account records and for each user the following information is 
displayed: 
1. User Name 
2. Latest Login Date and Time 
3. User Account Status (Enabled, Disabled) 
4. Assigned Role 
The report displayed can be printed at a later time. 
 
3.1.4 System Availability 
In the case the PS is not accessible by the MMI Client (and SysAdmin) due to a 
crash or to connectivity troubles, different cases applies: 
The User has already logged in the Password Server. 
In this case, the Trader user has been authenticated and he/she allowed to access 
Markets/Services according to the configuration associated with his/her User Main 
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account. Markets/Services accounts are cached in memory and the user is able to 
perform login to the markets. 
Any other operation the User tries to perform will fail due to server unreachable, e.g. 
Trader can try to change his/her own password. 
The Administrator User is able to access User Main Account and Service Account 
data in read only mode. He/She is not able to perform any operation on the PS until the 
PS restarts. 
In the case the user logs out from the PS, the operation is locally registered by the 
component and notified to the PS as soon as it is up again. 
The Trader User has not logged in the PS yet. 
In this case, when the user tries to login the PS the operation fails. The User is not 
thus authenticated by PS and he/she will need to access the Markets/Services by 
manually inserting the User Name and Passwords in the MMI (Multi) login window. 
The client in fact detects that the PS is not reachable and it allows the manual login to 
Markets. 
No other operation can be performed until the PS is unreachable. The Administrator 
cannot log in until the PS restarts. 
When the PS crashes the session records associated with the logged in users remain 
stored in the repository. At PS restart time, as the users were not able to notify the logout 
from the system and no new login was accepted, the PS flushes the table removing all 
the open sessions. 
In order to re-align the system with the clients the PS detects the components that 
are not registered to the platform anymore and will automatically logs out them. In 
addition, when the PS resumes from crash it will be notified by MMI client components 
and Sys Admin desktop of the local login status, i.e. whether the user has locally logged 
out when the PS was down. If this is the case the client component notify the PS, which 
will remove the corresponding record in the session table, forcing the logout of the user. 
When the PS resumes from crash MMI client components and Sys Admin desktop 
are notified (the PS registers itself to the CS). In this case, some users could be logged in 
to markets but no relevant session is present in the PS repository. In this case, MMI 
client users, in order to access again PS facilities (e.g. change passwords, automatic 
markets login) need login to PS trough MMI front end. 
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In case of crash of the MMI client or SysAdmin desktop the PS detects the 
component is not registered to the platform anymore and will automatically logs out the 
component removing the corresponding session record. 
 
3.1.5 High Availability Configuration 
The MarketView Architecture features standard system components on each 
instance of a platform responsible for managing and monitoring all the processes 
running on the platform. In particular the Process Manager enables the platform 
administrator to configure and monitor processes on each server running the 
MarketView platform. A PM is installed on each machine and will manage all 
MarketView processes run on that machine. 
 
Case 1: Software Failure, Thanks to the MarketView architecture the recovery for 
software component failure is easily solved by the MarketView platform by restarting 
the component through the PM, once it detects a failure. In the case that the PS restart 
fails on the primary server a backup component (if appropriately configured) can be 
restarted on a different machine. This will be discussed in further detail below. 
 
Case 2: HW Failure, i.e. failure of the machine hosting the PS component, the High 
Availability of the PS is addressed by configuring the MarketView platform in a failover 
mode. Adopting this configuration the platform components can be distributed across a 
number of machines. Backup processes are configured to start on a separate machine 
when their primary server goes down. The PM's will monitor the processes running on 
their respective machines and trigger recovery of any processes that fail. 
In this case, the PS can be replicated on a back up machine(s) through the PM on 
each machine, PM1 on the primary and PM2 for backup. 
 
As in case 1, when the backup PS starts a Shared Storage System would permit the 
access of the accounting data with the latest committed modification done by the 
primary PS. 
 
According to the configuration above described, if the Server 1 crashes the failover 
procedure will be triggered for the failed processes on the server and the remaining PMs 
will take ownership for the backup PS process. 
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3.1.6 Security Issues 
3.1.6.1 Cryptographic algorithms 
3.1.6.1.1 Symmetric Key Encryption 
Symmetric key algorithms encrypt and decrypt data using a single key. As shown in 
the following figure, the key and the plaintext message are passed to the encryption 
algorithm, producing ciphertext. The result can be sent across an insecure medium, 
allowing only a recipient who has the original key to decrypt the message, which is done 
by passing the ciphertext and the key to a decryption algorithm. Obviously, the key must 
remain secret for this scheme to be effective. 
Decryption
Algorithm
Symmetric Key
Encryption
Algorithm
OriginalData
Symmetric Key
Encrypted Data
OriginalData  
The main disadvantage of symmetric key algorithms is that the key must remain 
secret at all times. In particular, exchanging secret keys can be difficult, since usually 
keys have to be exchanged on the same medium that we're trying to use encryption to 
protect. 
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Sending the key in the clear before you use it leaves open the possibility of an 
attacker recording the key before even start sending data. 
3.1.6.1.2 Public Key Encryption 
Public key cryptography suggests a solution to the key distribution problem that 
affects symmetric cryptography. In the most popular form of public key cryptography, 
each party has two keys, one that must remain secret (the private key) and one that can 
be freely distributed (the public key). The two keys have a special mathematical 
relationship. 
When A wants to send a message to B using public key encryption (see Figure), A 
must first have B's public key. A then encrypts the message using B's public key, and 
delivers it. Once encrypted, only someone who has B's private key can successfully 
decrypt the message (hopefully, that's only B). 
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Encrypted Data
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B  
Public key encryption solves the problem of key distribution, assuming there is some 
way to find B's public key and ensure that the key really does belong to B. In practice, 
public keys are passed around with a bunch of supporting information called a 
certificate, and those certificates are validated by trusted third parties. Often, a trusted 
third party is an organization that does research (such as credit checks) on people who 
wish to have their certificates validated. SSL uses trusted third parties to help address the 
key distribution problem. 
3.1.6.1.3 Public Key Algorithms 
RSA 
RSA public key algorithm provides secrecy, authentication, and encryption all in 
one neat little package. 
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Unlike Diffie-Hellman and DSA, the RSA algorithm does not require parameters to 
be generated before keys can be generated, which simplifies the amount of work that is 
necessary to generate keys, and authenticate and encrypt communications. 
 
Generation of an RSA private key involves finding two large prime numbers, each 
approximately half the length of the key. A typical key size for RSA is 1,024. I t  is not 
recommended the use of smaller key lengths or key lengths greater than 2,048 bits. By 
default, the generated private key will be unencrypted. 
 
RSA is typically used in conjunction with a symmetric key cryptosystem such as 
DES. DES would be used to encrypt the message as a whole and then use RSA to 
encrypt the symmetric key. Thus, RSA provides a digital envelope for the message. 
 
The encryption algorithm itself is very slow, which makes it impractical to use RSA 
to encrypt large data sets. In PGP (and most other RSA-based encryption programs), a 
symmetrical key is encrypted using the public key, then the remainder of the data is 
encrypted with a faster algorithm using the symmetrical key. The symmetrical key itself 
is randomly generated, so that the only way to get it would be by using the private key to 
decrypt the RSA-encrypted symmetrical key. 
 
Diffie-Hellman 
Diffie-Hellman is used for key agreement. In simple terms, key agreement is the 
exchange of information over an insecure medium that allows each of the two parties in 
a conversation to compute a value that is typically used as the key for a symmetric 
cipher. 
By itself, Diffie-Hellman cannot be used for encryption or authentication; it only 
provides secrecy. Because the exchange of information takes place over an insecure 
medium, it should never be used by itself. 
Some means of authenticating the parties in the conversation should also be used. 
Diffie-Hellman works by first creating a set of parameters that are agreed upon by 
both parties in the conversation. The parameters, consisting of a randomly chosen prime 
number and a generator value that is typically specified as either 2 or 5, are public and 
can be either agreed upon before the conversation begins or exchanged as part of the 
conversation. 
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Using the agreed-upon parameters, each party computes a public and private key. As 
its name implies, the private key is never shared with anyone. The parties exchange their 
public keys, and then each party can compute the shared secret using their private key 
and the peer's public key. 
3.1.6.1.4 SSL 
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol is a set of rules governing server 
authentication, client authentication, and encrypted communication between servers and 
clients. SSL is widely used on the Internet, especially for interactions that involve 
exchanging confidential information such as credit card numbers. 
SSL requires a server SSL certificate, at a minimum. As part of the initial 
"handshake" process, the server presents its certificate to the client to authenticate the 
server's identity. The authentication process uses Public Key Encryption and Digital 
Signature to confirm that the server is in fact the server it claims to be. Once the server 
has been authenticated, the client and server use techniques of Symmetric Key 
Encryption which is very fast, to encrypt all the information they exchange for the 
remainder of the session and to detect any tampering that may have occurred. 
Servers may optionally be configured to require client authentication as well as 
server authentication. In this case, after server authentication is successfully completed, 
the client must also present its certificate to the server to authenticate the client's identity 
before the encrypted SSL session can be established. 
3.1.6.2 Secure Connection on the Password Server 
3.1.6.2.1 Establish Secure Connection using SSL approach 
At start up the MMI Client registers to CS as a first action. 
Upon successful registration the CS sends the MMI Client the Password Server 
reference for establishing connection with the Password Server. 
The MMI Client opens a connection with the Password Server. 
The MMI Client requests to open a secure connection sending data to set up the 
handshaking. The Password Server sends the Public Key to the connected MMI Client 
The MMI Client generate a "secret" to be shared with the PS, by using the PS Public 
Key encrypt data generated during the handshake 
The MMI Client sends the "secret" to the PS. 
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The Password Server uses the its Private Key to decrypt the "secret" sent by MMI 
Client and then, by using this "secret" performs the necessary task to create a session 
key. 
The MMI Client at the same time performs the same steps to generate the session 
key. 
The session keys are the symmetric keys exchanged between client and server and 
used to encrypt and decrypt information exchanged during the secure session. 
The MMI client sends a message to the Password Server informing it that future 
messages from the client will be encrypted with the session key. I t  then sends a separate 
(encrypted) message indicating that the client portion of the handshake is finished. 
The Password Server sends a message to the client informing it that future messages 
from the server will be encrypted with the session key. I t  then sends a separate 
(encrypted) message indicating that the server portion of the handshake is finished. 
3.1.6.2.2 Issues to be faced 
Storing of the Private key 
That private key needs to stay somewhere on the server. The most secure solution is 
to use cryptographic acceleration hardware. Most of these devices can generate and store 
key material, and additionally prevent the private key from being accessed by an attacker 
who has broken into the machine. 
In our case the hardware solutions could not be feasible because of the extra costs 
for the installation of the required additional hardware components, as well as the extra 
time that the IT personnel would spend installing and configuring all the workstations, 
and therefore there is no absolute way to protect the private key from an attacker who 
has obtained root access, because, at the very least, the key must be unencrypted in 
memory when handling a new connection. 
A possible solution could be the use of temporary key, also called ephemeral 
keying . 
This means a temporary key pair is generated when a new session is created. This is 
then used for key exchange and is subsequently destroyed. By using ephemeral keying, it 
is possible to achieve forward secrecy, meaning that if a key is compromised, messages 
encrypted with previous keys will not be subject to attack. 
Public Key 
Public key cryptography is expensive. Its strength is in the size of its keys, which are 
usually very large numbers. As a result, operations involving public key cryptography 
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are slow. This is the reason why it is often used in combination with other cryptographic 
algorithms such as symmetric encryption. 
Keys in public key algorithms are essentially large numbers with particular 
properties. Therefore, bit length of keys in public key ciphers aren't directly comparable 
to symmetric algorithms. With public key encryption algorithms, keys of 1,024 bits or 
more should be used to ensure reasonable security. 512-bit keys are probably too weak. 
Anything larger than 2,048 bits may be too slow. 
When selecting key lengths for public key algorithms, symmetric key lengths should 
be selected as well. Recommendations vary, but it is recommended using 1,024-bit 
public keys when the used encryption algorithm deals with symmetric keys that are less 
than 100 bits in length. In case of using 3DES or 128-bit keys, it is recommend to use 
2,048-bit public keys. 
Server Authentication 
When the Client receives the Public Key, and vice versa, it must be sure of the 
server identity's in order to trust on the received key. In practice, some sort of 
authentication mechanism is necessary to ensure that the keys are not accidentally 
exchanged with an attacker. 
Man in the Middle Attack 
The "man in the middle" is a program that intercepts all communication between the 
client and a server with which the client is attempting to communicate via secure 
connection. The program intercepts the legitimate keys that are passed back and forth 
during the SSL handshake, substitutes its own, and makes it appear to the client that it is 
the server, and to the server that it is the client. 
The encrypted information exchanged at the beginning of the secure connection 
handshake is actually encrypted with the program's public key or private key, rather than 
the client's or server's real keys. The program ends up establishing one set of session 
keys for use with the real server, and a different set of session keys for use with the 
client. This allows the program not only to read all the data that flows between the client 
and the real server, but also to change the data without being detected. 
3.1.6.3 Secure Password Storing 
Accounting data are stored in a centralized repository. In order to meet security 
requirements, passwords (along with all sensible data) are stored securely. Different 
crypto algorithms can be adopted for ciphering passwords. The Password Server 
component provide the user with a library which allows the storing and retrieving of data 
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to/from the database in a secure or not secure way. The user of the library decides which 
are the data to be stored in a secure way and it is able to decide which security algorithm 
to use. 
3.1.6.3.1 Secret Sharing approach 
The Secret Sharing algorithm divides data D into n pieces in such a way that D is 
easily reconstructable from any k pieces, but even complete knowledge of k - 1 pieces 
reveals absolutely no information about D. This technique enables the construction of 
robust key management schemes or cryptographic schemes that can function securely 
and reliably even when misfortunes destroy half the pieces and security breaches expose 
all but one of the remaining pieces. 
If we apply the approach to the problem of securing passwords 
This can be achieved through a k-out-of-n secret sharing scheme in which password 
P is divided in n secrets bits (Di) called shares in such a way that: 
1. knowledge of any k or more Di pieces makes password P easily re-
constructable; 
2. knowledge of any k - 1 or fewer Di pieces leaves password P completely 
undetermined. 
Such a scheme is called a (k, n) threshold scheme. 
Details on the algorithm can be found in [3]. 
For example, the password P can be divided in 3 shares and any two of them, (2,3) 
threshold schema, are necessary to reconstruct the password P. The 3 shares can then be 
stored separately and when the password needs to be read at least two of them are 
retrieved. 
The algorithm does not actually depend where the shares are physically stored. 
Shares can be stored either on a single server or on several servers. However, if we store 
shares on a single server, the secret would be disclosed if the server is compromised. If 
the server is corrupted, then the secret may be corrupted or lost. 
The ciphering library adopting the Secret Sharing must be initialized in order to 
define the threshold schema adopted, that means, it needs to initialize k and n values. In 
addition, the library makes the user transparent the distribution of the shares among 
different physical repository (on different servers). The initialization should therefore 
perform the activity to make available the repositories (e.g. databases) where the shares 
are stored. If less then k repositories are not available the Secret Sharing is considered 
unavailable and the user is notified. 
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In case a security algorithm is not available the Password Server can access only 
data stored without any ciphering algorithm. 
In the case the Password Server is restarted the initialization shall not be performed 
unless specifically required. The configuration of the threshold schema and the existing 
configuration of the repository distribution has to be acquired. Re-initializing the 
Password Server changing the parameters could cause the lost of the saved data (TBC). 
3.1.6.3.2 Private Key Ciphering approach 
 Several algorithms are available for securing data: 
• DES 
• Triple DES 
• AES 
• Blowfish 
• RC2 – RC4 
• CASTS 
The selected symmetric encryption algorithms provided by the OpenSSL library and 
included in the MkvCrypto library are: 
• Blowfish. 
Blowfish is a symmetric block cipher that operates on 64 bit (8 byte) blocks of data. 
I t  uses a variable size key, but typically, 128 bit (16 byte) keys are a considered good for 
strong encryption. Blowfish can be used in the same modes as DES. Blowfish is 
currently one of the fastest block ciphers. It  is quite a bit faster than DES, and much 
faster than IDEA or RC2. 
• DES3 
• AES 
The library is based on the OpenSSL open source crypto library. The OpenSSL 
provides a general interface called EVP interface. The EVP interface is independent 
from the ciphering algorithm and it is used in preference to the low level interfaces 
dependent on the ciphering algorithm. This will allow the code to become transparent to 
the cipher used and much more flexible. 
The ciphering algorithm to be used is set at Password Server initialization time. 
Obviously, once data are stored, the Password Server shall not be re-initialized with a 
different ciphering algorithm, as encrypted data will not be readable anymore. To this 
aim the selected algorithm is not configurable at run time. 
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Every ciphering algorithm used in the library need a key set up phase. A security 
issue is thus related to the retrieval of the key. As knowledge of the key also controls 
access to the encrypted data. Therefore, keys used for encrypting the password into the 
system database need to be securely stored and can be managed only by authorized 
users. The key can be hard coded in the Password Serve code. In case a key change is 
required a re-keying function needs to encrypt the whole secure data in the database. The 
function retrieve all the encrypted data from the database, decrypt them and then re-
encrypt all the data using the new key. The data are then stored into the database. 
3.1.7 Migration 
The migration address the issue of migrating the accounting data from the current 
approach to the PasswordServer. 
At start up the MMI client registers to the CS and checks about Password Server 
component availability (the PS must be previously registered to the CS) and the 
availability of the local password file, then the Migration Procedure is started. 
If PS is available the Migration Procedure logs in into the Password Server as 
special user with Administrator rights specifically created for the migration 
procedure. 
If login fails the migration procedure is aborted. The MMI starts without accessing 
the Password Server but the usual local password file. 
The following table summarizes the action to be taken by the Migration Procedure 
depending on the availability of the two items involved in the migration: Password 
Server and MMI Password Local file. 
PS Password Local Action 
Available Not Available The Migration was performed and the MMI 
  connect to Password Server 
Not Available No migration can be performed. The MMI 
  connect to the platform and markets by using 
 the local file data.
Available Available The Migration Procedure is started 
 
 
If login is successful, MMI migration procedure reads from the local password file 
the user name and password of the MMI user and then, it creates the relevant User 
Account into the Password Server. The account has Traders role (read only). No users 
with Administrator role can be in any case created by the migration procedure. 
If the creation is not successful the MMI client logs out from the Password Server 
and the migration procedure is aborted. 
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If the User Account is successfully created, the MMI migration procedure keep on 
reading from the local password file the market accounts (user and password) and create 
a Service Account in the Password Server for each market account found. 
If creation of Service Accounts is not successful the migration procedure is aborted. 
The already created User Account is deleted and consequently all the contained Service 
Accounts already created. 
If creation of all market accounts is successful the migration procedure is 
terminated. 
Then MMI starts and the User is requested to set a new password (different from the 
old one) before logging in so that the user account in the local password file is no more 
usable. 
System Administrator shall be reported of failed migrations and he shall perform the 
corrective actions manually. 
System Administrator once the migration of all client machines is performed shall 
remove/disable the migration account in order to avoid unauthorized use of this account. 
 
3.2 Password Server Architecture 
3.2.1 Overall Architecture 
Password Server 
CryptoLib. 
MMI Client 
CryptoLib. MkvDB 
MkvSecurity 
MkvCrypto 
SysAdmin 
CryptoLib. 
MkvCrypto MkvDB MkvDB 
MkvCrypto 
 
3.2.2 Server Side 
3.2.2.1 Integration with MkvDB Protocol 
3.2.2.1.1 Using MkvDB Layer 
In order to implement the repository four tables have been created see section “DB 
Schema”. 
Login 
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The login is performed by adding a record in the Session table. As the component 
name is a primary key for the table only one login from a component is allowed. When 
the server receives a request of adding a record in the Session table it performs all the 
required check before committing the request. If the login is not successful the 
component is notified with an error code. 
Create a User 
The creation of a user is performed by adding a record in the User_Account table. 
As the User Name is primary key for the table no records with the same user name are 
allowed to be inserted. Before committing the request of adding a new User_Account 
record, the server performs all the necessary checks. The component performing the 
request is notified of the result of the operation. 
Modify a User Account 
In order to modify the data of a User Account a new record in the table a rewrite 
operation o the table is performed. The operation allow the update of an entire record. 
As the user with Trader privileges shall not be allowed to modify any field apart 
from the his/her own password, a check is performed in this case. 
Create Service Account 
Get Service Account 
3.2.2.2 MkvDB Repository 
The PS persitent repository is based on the files crated by the MkvDB library 
3.2.2.3 Secure Connections 
The secure connection between MMI Client and Password Server is obtained by 
ciphering sensible data (user names, passwords) flowing over the MkvDB protocol. 
A symmetric encryption algorithm is used to cipher sensible data exchanged 
between MMI Client (System Admin, TBD) and Password Server. The ciphering of data 
is obtained by exploiting the crypto library provided by the OpenSSL open source. 
In order to share the same symmetric key the Password Server and the MMI client 
need to exchange it. The exchange of symmetric key must take place over a secure 
connection. To this aim an asymmetric encryption algorithm based on public key 
distribution is used. 
The pair, Public key and Private key, necessary to set up the asymmetric encryption 
algorithm, is generated both by the Password Server and MMI Client at start up. Then, 
the Public key is passed to the CS component at registration time so that the CS acts as 
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Public key distributor to all components requesting a public key to establish secure 
connections. 
In practice, the CS is able to associate a Public Key with each registered component 
and to forward such a key to the component that makes request for the Public Key in 
order to establish a secure communication. 
MMI
Password Server
PS
Configuration Server
CS
MMI Client
Component Public Key Attributes
MMI Client 1 278sd346r User…..
Password Srv. 4te6tyegvr User…..
MMI Client 2 2734fijhfkr User…..
Re
gis
ter
1. Generate Public
and Private Keys
2. Register to CS and
forward Public Key
(PubkMMI)
Account data
Register
PubkMMI
PubkPS
PubkMMI
PubkPS
PrivK
 
3.2.2.3.1 Scenario 
1 MMI client starts. 
2 MMI client generates Public key and Private key for setting up secure 
communication with asymmetric encryption algorithm with the Password Server. 
3 The Private key is locally maintained within the MMI client. 
The MMI client registers to the Configuration Server (CS) and, along with the others 
attributes it forwards the Public Key. 
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4 From its side the Password Server at start up generate its own Public and Private 
keys 
5 The Password Server registers to the CS and, along with the others attributes it 
forwards its Public Key. 
6 The CS publishes the Public Key of the Password Server to subscribed 
components (MMI clients) that in this way receive the PS Public Key (PubkPS). 
7 On the other end the CS publishes the Public Key of registered MMI clients so that 
the Password Server can subscribe to receive keys (PubkMMI) of all registered 
MMI clients. 
8 Where it tries repetitively to re-establish the connection until it succeeds (the 
retrying time is configurable). 
If the connection to DB is lost when the PS has initialized and it is correctly running 
(so, initialization phase is successfully terminated) the PS is not disabled but it goes into 
a read-only mode and the DB reconnection procedure is started. 
3.2.2.3.1.1 Default Accounts 
The first time the Password Server is started the repository contains a default 
account record. 
One record has Administrator Role, a set of Default parameters, and no password. 
This is used in the very first access to the Password Server made by an Administrator. 
At start up the PS checks whether at least one record is stored in the User Account 
table. If no record is present the PS realizes that this is the first system start up (or the 
repository has been lost) and creates it during the initialization phase. 
The created User Account has the following predefined value: 
 
User Name = "Superuser" 
Password = " " 
Role = "Admin" 
MaxFailureLogin = "3" 
FailureCount = "0" 
ExpirationTime = "00-00-0000" 
LastLoginDate = "00-00-0000" 
LastLoginTime = "00:00:00:00" 
Idletime = "0" 
CreationDate = Today() 
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Enabled = "1" 
Personallnfo = " " 
When the Administrator tries to log into the PS he/she is forced to set the password 
before performing any operation, see 4.2.6.3.3. The relevant attribute is therefore set 
accordingly as a default value. 
The pre-created account has Default parameters that can be then changed by the 
Administrator once logged in. 
A Default account for Trader role is also pre-created within the repository but it 
cannot be accessed by any user. I t  will be used when a new User Account is created to 
provide set of default values to the client in order to simplify the creation procedure to 
the Administrator. 
A default value of the default account is 
3.2.2.3.1.2 Initialize Security 
The PS then generates the pair of keys, Public and Private, for setting up the secure 
connection with components (MMI clients) based on the asymmetric encryption 
algorithm. 
The keys are stored in the Key Table. Where the Symmetric Key field is used for PS 
private key. The PS once initialized can register to the CS by issuing the 
Psh_Register ( ) specifying along with the usual parameters the Public key 
generated after initialization. 
3.2.2.3.2 Establishing Secure Connections 
When the Password Server receives the event of the registration of a component 
from CS it acquires:  
 9. For each registered MMI components (MMI Clients): 
• The Password Server generates the symmetric key for the component 
(MMI client) to be connected. 
• The Private key is then ciphered by using the relevant MMI client Public 
key and sent to the MMI client. 
 10. The MMI client requests the symmetric key from PS in order to be able to 
exchange data in an encrypted format. 
 11. The MMI client is now ready to login to the Password Server ciphering the 
user name and password with the received symmetric key. 
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3.2.2.3.3 Password Server Key repository 
For each registered component that forward Public key to the Password Server a 
record within a relevant table is maintained in order to establish the relationship between 
public key and component. In addition, the Password Server generates a symmetric key 
for establishing the symmetric encryption algorithm with the component. The key is 
stored in the same table 's record. 
Component 1 SymmetricKey1
Component 2 SymmetricKey2
Component n SymmetricKeyn  
3.2.2.3.4  Configuration Server Table 
The Configuration Server Table is extended in order to cope with the storing of 
Public Key of each registered component. 
 
 
Component 1 Type User Name Host Port PublicKey1 
Component 2 Type User Name Host Port PublicKey2 
Component m Type User Name Host Port PublicKey m 
 
3.2.2.4 Password Server Layer 
3.2.2.4.1 Password Server Start Up 
When the Password Server starts up, it performs an initialization phase. The 
configuration file pwd.ini is read in order to initialize internal data structures and 
password repository at first PS start up. The connection to the database storing accounts 
data is performed. The Account records are retrieved from DB and cached in to 
Password Server. 
3.2.2.4.1.1 Initialize Repository 
If, at Password Server start up, the connection wit the account database cannot be 
established the Password Server is disabled and no login is allowed. The Password 
Server enters into a status 
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• Component name 
• Component type 
• Component Public Key (if the component type supports secure 
communications) 
Inserts the data in the Key Table creating a new record. If the component already 
exist. 
In the case a de-registration event the corresponding entry in the Key Table is 
removed. 
Upon receipt of a MMI client registration event, that means a connection is 
established with the MMI client, the PS acquires the type of component that established 
the connection, and if the component is able to set up a secure connection (MMI Client) 
(i.e. it is registered in the key table), the PS needs to send the Symmetric key to the juts 
connected component. The Symmetric key is encrypted by using the component Public 
key, which is retrieved from the Key Table. 
Now the PS is able to receive the login request from the MMI client where User 
Name and Password are encrypted using the exchanged symmetric key. 
3.2.2.4.2 Accounting Operations 
3.2.2.4.2.1 Password Expiration 
Each User Account has associated a password expiration date attribute. The attribute 
is set when the account is created and any time the password is changed. When the user 
tries to login, the PS checks whether the password is expired by comparing the current 
login date with the expiration date. The expiration date is obtained by adding the 
expiration time to the date the password is changed. The expiration time attribute, 
expressed in days, defines how long the password will remain valid after have being set. 
If the password is expired the User is notified of the expiration and the notification 
counter is incremented. When the max number of notifications allowed, is reached, the 
login is denied and the account is disabled. The maximum number of notification before 
disabling the account is a configurable parameter. 
3.2.2.4.2.2 User Account Expiration 
A User Account is disabled after a time of user inactivity, i.e. no login is performed 
on the account for an amount of time which is greater than a defined maximum value. 
The LastLoginTime is thus maintained as an account attribute which will be compared to 
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the MaxIdleDate attribute which gives the time when the User Account is disable if no 
login is performed. Every time a login is performed the MaxIdleDate is reset with the 
new computed value. The value is computed by adding the current date to the IdleTime 
attribute, which gives the amount of time an account can remain idle. The value is 
expressed in days. 
When the user performs the login the LastLoginTime is compared to the current 
login time and if the difference is greater then the defined MaxIdleTime the access is 
denied due to Account expiration. The account is thus put to Disabled. 
3.2.2.4.2.3 Change Password at first Login 
An attribute defining whether a user is forced to change his/her own password at the 
first login is set depending on a relevant configuration value. The PS checks whether the 
user has never logged in by looking at LastLoginDate. If this attribute is set to the initial 
default value no login has been performed yet and the user will be requested to change 
the password (if the relevant attribute is set accordingly). 
When a Password is changed the Expiration Date is set with the current date plus the 
ExpirationTime. At the first login the User is thus authorized to access the account if the 
ExpirationDate is different from the initial default value (e.g. 1/1/1900). 
3.2.2.4.2.4 Checking Password Policy 
When a new account is created or a password is changed the format of the new 
password is checked in order to be compliant with the defined password policy. The 
password policy is a set of attributes stored in a configuration file that specifies: 
• Password minimum length 
• Minimum number of Numeric chars that must be present in the password 
string 
• Minimum number of Alphanumeric chars that must be present in the 
password string 
• Password different from User Name check enabled 
3.2.2.4.2.5 Enabling an account 
An Administrator is able to enable or disable an account. In the case a disabled 
account is re-enabled the administrator is requested to set a new password, then the 
account is authorized to access the platform again. 
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3.2.2.5 Crypto Layer 
3.2.2.5.1 Symmetric Key encryption primitives 
The Crypto layer embeds the OpenSSL EVP interface for symmetric keys and 
provides the following operations: 
CypherCTX_Init() 
Initialize the encryption context. 
Encrypt_Init() 
Decrypt_Init() 
Generate the symmetric key. 
Set_Key() 
Set up cipher context respectively for encryption and decryption by setting the 
ciphering type (the used algorithm) and relevant parameters like the symmetric key 
to use and IV to use (if necessary). 
Encrypt() and Decrypt() 
The actual encryption and decryption operations. 
3.2.2.5.2 Asymmetric Key Encryption Primitives 
RSA *GeneratePrivateKey (numbits, callback, arg, 
result) 
Generate the private key to be used in the asymmetric encryption algorithm (e.g. 
RSA). 
RSA * GeneratePubliKey (void) 
Generate the public key to be used in the asymmetric encryption algorithm. In the 
RSA it calls the RSA_New() primitive of the OpenSSL library. 
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3.2.2.6 Crypto Layer TBD 
3.2.2.7 MkvSecurity Layer 
The layer provides the user with the operation for accessing the Password 
Server features making transparent the use of MkvDB to the user application (MMI 
Client or System Adminitrator Tool). 
Initialize the library MkvSecurity library and must be called before the 
Psh_Init(). 
static bool init(UserRequestCallback = 0); 
static bool shutDown(); 
 
// Requests 
static int Login(const std::string 
&UserName, const 
std::string Password); 
 
static int Logout(); 
 
Create a new User Account in the Repository 
 
static int CreateAccount(const std::string 
&UserName, const 
std::string &Passwd, 
const std::string 
&PersonalInfo, int Enabled, 
unsigned long 
LastLoginDate, unsigned 
long LastLoginTime, int 
MaxFailureLogin, 
unsigned long 
ExpirationTime, int 
FailureCount, 
const std::string &RoleStr); 
static int ModifyAccount(const std::string 
&UserName, const std::string 
&Passwd, 
const std::string &PersonalInfo, 
int Enabled, 
unsigned long LastLoginDate, 
unsigned long LastLoginTime, 
int MaxFailureLogin, 
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unsigned long ExpirationTime, 
int FailureCount, 
const std::string &RoleStr); 
static int DeleteAccount(const std::string &UserName); 
static int CreateServices(const std::string &ServiceName, 
const std::string 
&ServicePassword, const 
std::string &ServiceUserName, 
const std::string &UserName); 
 
int Public_Encrypt (int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned 
char *to, key, int padding) 
 
int Private_Decrypt (int flen, unsigned char *from, 
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int 
padding); 
 
int Private_Encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned 
char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); 
 
int Public_Decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, unsigned 
char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); 
 
Where RSA is defined as 
The RSA structure consists of several BIGNUM components. It  can contain 
public as well as private RSA keys: 
 
struct 
{ 
BIGNUM *n; // public modulus 
BIGNUM *e; // public exponent 
BIGNUM *d; // private exponent 
BIGNUM *p; // secret prime factor 
BIGNUM *q; // secret prime factor 
BIGNUM *dmpl; // d mod (p-1) 
BIGNUM *dmgl; // d mod (q-1) 
BIGNUM *igmp; // q^-1 mod p 
}; 
In public keys, the private exponent and the related secret values are NULL. 
3.2.2.7.1 Integration of the OpenSSL Crypto Library 
3.2.2.8 Configuration Parameters 
The following parameters are configured from file 
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    const std::string &UserName); 
Create a new account in the repository of Services account, that means where 
the electronic markets user name and passwords are actually stored. The operation 
can be called only by system administrator 
static int ModifyService(const std::string &ServiceName, 
const std::string 
&ServicePassword, const 
std::string &ServiceUserName, 
const std::string &UserName); 
static int DeleteService(const std::string &UserName, 
const std::string &ServiceName, 
const std::string 
&ServiceUserName); 
 
// Subscriptions  
static int GetServices(); 
 static int GetAccount(); 
static std::string MKVSecurity::requestToString(MKVSecurity_Request 
Req); 
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3.3 UML Class Diagram 
+write() : bool
+read() : ServiceAccount
+initialize()
SecureDB
+Write()
+Read()
+Connect() : MIXDBConnection
+InitDB()
DB
+Cipher_CTX_Init() : int
+Set_Key()
+Encrypt_Init() : int
+Decrypt_Init() : int
+Encrypt_Final() : int
+Decrypt_Final() : int
+Encrypt_Update() : int
+Enable_Padding()
+GenerateSymmetricKey()
+GeneratePrivateKey()
+PublicEncrypt()
+PublicDecrypt()
+PrivateEncrypt()
+PrivateDecrypt()
+GeneratePublicKey()
CryptoLib
+Read()
+Write()
-UserName
-Password
AccountData
+CheckPassword() : bool
+EnableAccount()
+DisableAccount()
+SetPassword()
-UserProfile
-CreationDate
-MaxFailedLogin : short = 3
-ExpirationTime
-PersonalInfo : string
-FailedLoginCount : short
-Enabled : bool
-LastLoginTime
-OldPasswordList
-MaxActiveSession : short = 1
UserAccount
-ServiceName
-ServiceId
-Profile
ServiceAccount
-belongs to
1-has
0..*
+CreateAccount() : UserAccount
+DeleteAccount() : bool
+PurgeAccounts()
+Login() : bool
-IfActive() : UserAccount
+Logout()
+Initialize()
+GetService() : ServiceAccount
PasswordServer
-End11
-End61..*
«uses»
+CheckPolicy() : bool
-MinLength
-MinNumeric
-MinASCII
-DifferentFromUser : bool
PasswordPolicy
1
-apply
1
+AddRecord()
+Purge()
-MaxSize : long
-FileName : unsigned char
-HomeDir : unsigned char
AccessLog
-LoginTime
-UsedUserName
-LoginResult
-ClientIP
AccessActivityRecord
-End71
-End80..*
-End9
1
-End10*
-SessionId : long
ActiveSession
-End11
1
-End120..*
-End130..*
-End14
1
+AddKey()
+RemoveKey()
KeyTable
Key
-In 1
-Contains 0..*
1
1
*
*
«uses»
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3.4 Database Schema 
SESSION
PK Component
FK1 UserName
Passwd
LastId
USER_ACCOUNT
PK UserName
Passwd
Role
MaxFailureLogin
FailureCount
ExpirationTime
LastLoginDate
LastLoginTime
CreationDate
Enabled
PersonalInfo
ExpirationRelTime
IdleTime
SERVICE_ACCOUNT
PK,FK1 UserName
PK,FK2 ServiceName
PK ServiceUserName
ServicePassword
SERVICES
PK,FK1 ServiceName
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3.5 Data Structures 
The data structure are described in the ION proprietary format suitable for 
being used by the MkvDB protocol. 
 
 DEFINE PS_MAX_SERVICE  50 
 DEFINE PS_MAX_USERS 1 
 DEFINE PS MAX SERVICES  1 
 DEFINE PS_MAX_USER_LEN  64 
 DEFINE PS_MAX_INFO_LEN  64 
 DEFINE PS_MAX_PASSWD_LEN  32 
 DEFINE PS_MAX_SERVICE_LEN  32 
 DEFINE PS MAX SERVICE ID LEN 10 
 DEFINE PS_MAX_OLDPASSWD_NEM 20 
 DEFINE PS_MAX_OLDPASSWD_LEN 
(PS_MAX_PASSWD_LEN+1)*PS_MAX_OLDPASSWD_NUM 
 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 PS_SERVICE_ACCOUNT: 
 Table that defines the services accessed by the Users 
(Markets,..)  
 Owner: Password Server 
 Access: Read Trader, 
 Read/Write Admin 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
 STRUCT PS_SERVICE_ACCOUNT PS_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_ID 
  STRING UserName[PS_MAX_USER_LEN] 
  STRING ServiceName[PS_MAX_SERVICE_LEN] 
  STRING ServiceUserName[PS_MAX_USER_LEN] 
  STRING ServicePassword[PS_MAX_PASSWD_LEN]  
 ENDSTRUCT 
 KEY PS_SERVICE_ACCOUNT PS_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY 
PS_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_KEY KEYUNIQUE 
  UserName KEYTYPE(STRING,KEYA) 
  ServiceName KEYTYPE(STRING,KEYA) 
  ServiceUserName KEYTYPE(STRING,KEYA)  
 ENDKEY 
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;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 PS_USER_ACCOUNT: User's Table 
 Owner: Password Server 
 Access: Read Read/Write (Admin)  
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
 ENUM PS_USER_ROLE 
  PS_USER_UNKNOWN "Unknown" 
  PS USER ADMIN "Admin" 
  PS_USER_TRADER "Trader"  
 ENDENUM 
  
 STRUCT PS_USER_ACCOUNT PS_USER_ACCOUNT_ID 
  STRING UserName[PS_MAX_USER_LEN] 
  STRING Passwd[PS_MAX_PASSWD_LEN] 
  PS_USER_ROLE Role 
  INT MaxFailureLogin 
  INT FailureCount 
  LDATE ExpirationTime 
  LDATE LastLoginDate 
  LTIME LastLoginTime 
  LDATE CreationDate 
  INT Enabled 
  INT IdleTime 
  INT ActiveSession 
  INT ValidFor 
  STRING Personallnfo[PS_MAX_INFO_LEN]  
 ENDSTRUCT 
 KEY PS_USER_ACCOUNT PS_USER_NAME_KEY PS_USER_NAME_KEY KEYUNIQUE 
  UserName KEYTYPE(STRING,KEYA)  
 ENDKEY 
  
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 PS_SESSION: 
 Session Table 
 Owner: Password Server 
 Access: Read (), Read/Write () 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
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 STRUCT PS_SESSION PS_SESSION_ID 
  STRING Component[PS_MAX_USER_LEN] 
  STRING UserName[PS_MAX_USER_LEN] 
  STRING Passwd[PS_MAX_PASSWD_LEN] 
  INT LastId  
 ENDSTRUCT 
 
 KEY PS_SESSION PS_SESSION_KEY PS_SESSION_KEY
 KEYUNIQUE 
  Component KEYTYPE(STRING,KEYA) ENDKEY 
   
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 PS_PASSWD_POLICY: 
 Table that defines the rules to accept a password Owner:
 Password Server 
 Access: Read Trader, 
 Read/Write Admin 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
  
 STRUCT PS_PASSWD_POLICY PS_PASSWD_POLICY_ID 
  INT MinLenght 
  INT MinNumeric 
  INT MinASCII 
  INT DifferentFromUser  
 ENDSTRUCT 
  
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 PS_ACCESS_LOG: 
 Table that defines the log file Owner: Password Server 
 Access: Read Trader, 
 Read/Write Admin 
;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; 
 
 STUCT PS_ACCESS_LOG PS_ACCESS_LOG_ID 
  INT MaxLogSize 
  STRING FileName 
  STRING HomeDir  
 ENDSTRUCT 
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4 User Guide 
4.1 Introducing the Password Server 
Component 
This section contains a brief overview of the IONTM MarketViewTM 
Password Server. 
The Password Server (PS) is a specific component that deals with the 
management of all accounting data needed by MarketView users to access the 
platform itself and the provided services (e.g. access to the markets). 
The Password Server authentication mechanism is based on the Single 
Sign On paradigm, whereby a single action of user authentication can permit a 
user to gain access to the markets and platform services he/she is allowed to 
work with. 
The data (mainly user names and passwords) are thus centralized within 
the platform and accessible from all the connected MMI Clients. The user 
needs to log to the Password Server and his/her related accounting data are 
automatically acquired by the MMI Client in order to be then used for 
accessing the different markets (through relevant gateways) transparently to the 
user. 
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4.1.1 User and Services Accounts 
The Password Server manages the repository where are stored the account 
data related to users that want to access the markets and services for 
performing the trading activity. 
The Password Server manages two types of account data: 1 User Main 
Accounts and Services Accounts. 
A User Main Account contains accounting information related to the User 
accessing the MarketView platform. It includes: 
• User Name 
• Password 
• Personal Info 
• Role 
• Account creation time 
• Account expiration time 
• Password expiration time 
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• Account status (Enabled/Disabled) 
A Service Account contains information concerning the accounting data 
for accessing both the markets and platform services. It includes: 
• Service Name 
• User Name to access the market/service  
• Password for accessing the market/service 
4.1.2 User Profile (Roles) 
Two User Profiles, or Roles, are defined in the User Main Account and 
managed accordingly: 
• Administrator 
• Trader 
The Administrator is allowed to: 
• View all User Accounts stored in the PS repository 
• View all Service Accounts associated with a User 
and to Create/Modify/Delete: 
• User Accounts, 
• Service Accounts 
The Trader, is allowed to: 
• Change his/her own user account password and 
• Change passwords associated with services/markets he/she is 
configured to work with 
• Login to Markets/Services 
 
4.1.3 Logging in as Administrator 
The Administrator of the Password Server is able to access the repository 
and manage it from System Administrator Desktop only. 
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4.1.4 Logging in as Trader 
The Trader is not allowed to access and manage the Password Server 
repository apart from changing his/her own passwords. 
The Trader is allowed to access MMI Client front end and he /she is not 
allowed to access the Password Server through the System Administrator 
desktop. 
4.1.4.1 Login to Markets 
The successful login of the trader from MMI front end to Password Server 
enables the auto login to Markets. In this way the User is able to login the 
Markets/Services configured without issuing relevant user names and 
passwords. 
The actual login is performed transparently acquiring markets accounts 
from the Password Server. 
The manual login to the Markets remains anyhow available to the trader, 
which, in this case, needs to know the user name and password for accessing 
the market. 
Summarizing, the presence of the Password Server is as much as possible 
transparent to the Trader who is able to access the markets as usual, either 
manually or automatically. 
 
4.1.5 User Authentication 
In order to access the market/services from the ION MMI Front-End 
exploiting the auto login facility, the Trader needs to be authenticated by the 
Password Server. A User Main Account for the trader has to be created by the 
Administrator within the PS repository and the trader needs to know his/her 
User Name and Password. 
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In order to be authenticated by the Password Sever, the trader needs to 
login from MMI Front-End by issuing User Name and Password. 
 
Upon receipt of the login request the Password Server performs all the 
checks required against the stored User Main Account data, e.g.: 
 
• the User Name belongs to an existing account the passwords match 
• the account has not been disabled 
• the account has not expired 
• in general, any authorization check passes successfully (see next 
sections) 
 
If the login is successfully executed the Trader is allowed to access 
services passwords in order to access the markets and platform services is 
configured to work with. The Password Server, transparently to the user 
manages the Service Accounting data associated with the User Main Account, 
so that the trader will be then able to perform auto login to the 
markets/services. 
 
4.1.6 Accounting Data Administration 
Accounting data are stored in a central repository accessed by the 
Password Server application. Through Password Sever, Administrator users are 
able to manage all accounting data. 
At system initialization one pre-defined user is present in the database. 
This user has the Administrator profile. In this state the system refuses any 
other access by any user different from the pre-defined Administrator. 
Starting from this first account the Administrator is able to create all other 
accounts. In order to facilitate and speed up the initialization of the Password 
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Server repository a migration procedure is available (see Performing the 
Migration). 
Administrator users can manage the accounting data through the System 
Administrator Desktop (see reference document). 
The Administrator has full visibility of the Password Server Repository 
and he/she is in charge of creating new User Main Accounts specifying the role 
of the account and the relevant accounting information and password 
management policy. 
4.1.6.1 Password Management Policy 
When a new User Main Account is created, or a User Main Account 
password is changed, the format of the password must be inserted following a 
pre-defined policy. 
In particular, the following constraints apply: 
• Passwords shall have a defined minimum length (default 6 chars), 
• Passwords shall include a minimum number of numeric digit (or a 
special ASCII character), 
• User name shall be different from password 
• When the user is asked to change a password he/she is not allowed 
to enter a password already used. 
• The system can be configured so that the user is forced to change 
the password set by the Administrator at user's account creation 
time 
The above described constraints are set at configuration time by assigning 
appropriate values to the variables defined in the configuration file mkv.init. 
The policy is thus applied to all the users accessing the Password Server, 
and, if it needs to be modified, the configuration file has to be changed and the 
Password Server restarted. When a Password Policy is changed it is applied to 
new created passwords only. 
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4.1.6.2 Secure Password Storing 
Accounting data are stored in a central repository. In order to meet security 
requirements, sensible data like passwords are stored securely, i.e. ciphered 
with on of the most secure and up to date encryption algorithm. 
4.1.6.3 Applying Password Ageing User Main Account 
passwords 
A password expires after a defined period of time (default 30 days). When 
expiration time is reached, user is allowed to log in but he/she is prompted to 
change the password for the account. If he/she does not, the account will be 
disabled. 
The user will not be able to access a disabled account. 
The password expiration time is defined by the Administrator and can be 
modified on a User per User basis. 
The Administrator is able to change the expiration time initial for any User 
Account. 
4.1.6.4 Disabling a user account after a specified time of user 
inactivity 
It is possible to define the maximum time of a user account inactivity, that 
is, the user account is disabled if no-one has logged in with the specified User 
Name for a specified period time. 
The maximum time a user account can remain idle is defined in the User 
Main Account data associated with the user. 
The maximum idle time for a user account initial default value is set at 
configuration time in the file mkv.init. 
The Administrator is able to change the maximum idle time value for any 
User Account 
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4.1.7 Logging and reporting 
Every access to the Password Server (either successful or not) and any 
modification performed to the repository are logged into a log file. 
The path where the file is stored in the file system is defined in the 
Password Server configuration file. If not defined the file is stored in the 
default directory LOGS placed where the Password Server is started. 
The log records are reported in ASCII format so that the file can be easily 
read and printed out. 
Moreover, the used format is suitable for being then read by the Explorer 
ION tool. 
 
4.1.8 Migrating to the Password Server 
The migration procedure addresses the issue of migrating the user names 
and passwords from the current distributed approach to the centralized 
approach adopted by the Password Server. 
At start up the MMI Client looks for Password Server component 
availability and the presence on the trader desktop of the preference file, 
pwd.mvi, where passwords are stored. 
When both conditions are valid, the migration procedure is automatically 
started. 
If the procedure terminates successfully the relevant Trader account is 
created in the Password Server repository with the same User Name and 
Password stored in the pwd.mvi file. The other account fields are assigned to 
initial default values that can be then modified by Administrator. 
In addition, a Service Account for each all market/service stored in the 
pwd.mvi is created in the PS repository. 
If the procedure fails the user is notified accordingly and the migration is 
aborted. 
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The MMI Client starts without accessing the Password Server but 
passwords are read from the local password file pwd.mvi. 
IT authorized personnel, once the migration of a MMI Client machine is 
performed, should remove/disable the pwd.mvi file in order to avoid 
unauthorized use of this file. In any case, the MMI Client will not access the 
file. 
 
4.1.9 Password Server Availability 
In the case the PS component is unreachable due to connectivity problems 
or because the component is not running, the Trader user, who did not login to 
the system yet, will not be able to be authenticated by Password Server and 
perform auto-login to markets/services. 
Therefore, he/she will need to login the Markets/Services by manually 
inserting the User Name and Passwords in the MMI login window. 
No operation on the PS repository (e.g. change the password) can be 
performed as long as the PS is unreachable. 
 
4.2 Trader Interface 
This section describes the features of the user interface available to Trader 
user. 
4.2.1 Login as Trader 
4.2.1.1 Login at MMI Client start up 
At MMI client start up the MMI Login window is displayed (if configured 
in the preferences) to trader in order to access MMI Client and the Password 
Server facility. 
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The Trader to login to the Password Server needs to perform the following 
steps: 
• Insert User Name in Login field 
• Insert password in the Password field  
• Click on the Login button to login 
4.2.1.2 Login from Toolbar 
The trader is allowed to login from the MMI Client toolbar. 
 
• Click on the Login button 
• MMI Login window is displayed 
• Insert User Name in the Login field and Password 
 
The trader can enable the automatic login to markets by ticking the 
relevant tick box in the MMI Login window. 
When Auto login is enabled the trader is transparently logged to the 
markets that are configured into the Password Server repository 
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4.2.1.3 Login Failure 
In some case the PS might refuse the user login. Different causes can 
prevent the user from logging in. 
 
Password Server component is unreachable 
The Password Server is down and MMI Client cannot connect. Login is 
refused. The Trader needs to login manually to markets. 
 
User does not exist 
Either the User Name in the Login field is wrong or the relevant User 
Main Account has not been created in the repository. 
 
 
Password is wrong 
The password inserted does not correspond to the one stored in the 
repository's User Main Account. 
 
 
User account has been disabled 
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The Login fails because the User Main Account is disabled. The account 
could be disabled either automatically by the system or manually by the PS 
Administrator. 
The following reasons cause the User Main Account being disabled 
automatically: 
• Maximum number of login failures has been reached. For example, 
the user tried to login with a wrong password for a number of times 
that reach the maximum number set by the administrator. 
• The User Main Account is expired. The User Account has not been 
used (no login performed) for the amount of time that exceeded the 
maximum value set by the PS Administrator. 
In any case, only the PS Administrator can enable again the User Main 
Account. 
The PS Administrator can manually disable any account by accessing the 
PS Administrator panel on the MarketView System administrator desktop. 
 
4.2.2 Trader Interface 
4.2.2.1 Change User Account Password 
The trader is able to change his/her own User Main Account password. 
 
• Select the Tools menu in the toolbar 
• Select Login Details 
• A MMI Multi Login details window is displayed 
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The MMI multi login window provides the user with the ability to change 
both his/her own User Main Account password and markets/services 
passwords. 
To change User Main Account password: 
• Insert the current User password in the Old Password field 
• Insert the new password in the Password field 
• Insert the new password in the Confirm field for confirmation  
• Select OK to apply password change 
• Select Cancel to abort password change 
4.2.2.2 Change Service Account Password 
The trader is able to change is markets/services password associated 
with his/her account. 
• Select the MMI menu in the toolbar 
• Select Login Details 
• An MMI Multi Login details window is displayed 
The MMI Multi login details window provides the user with the ability 
to change both his/her own User Main Account password and 
markets/services passwords. 
To change Service Account password 
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MMI Multi Login details window displays, apart from the user, a row for 
each market/service associated with the user account and configured in the 
market.mvi file. 
To change the password of a desired market/service: 
• Insert the current password in the OldPassword field in the row 
corresponding to the desired market/service, 
• Insert the new password in the corresponding Password field 
• Insert the new password in the corresponding Confirm field for 
confirmation 
• Select OK to change password  
• Select Cancel to abort operation 
4.2.2.3 Add Password to a New Market/Service 
The Trader is able to insert a Password for a new market, which is 
configured in the market.mvi file but not in the Password Server repository. 
To perform the operation: 
• Select the MMI menu in the toolbar 
• Select Login Details 
• An MMI Multi Login details window is displayed 
• A new Service Account data row is present in the MMI Multi 
Login window where the OldPassword field is not editable and 
Password and Confirm are empty. 
• Insert the User to login to the Market 
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• Insert the new password in the corresponding Password field 
• Insert the new password in the corresponding Confirm field for 
confirmation 
• Select OK to change password 
• Select Cancel to abort operation 
 
4.3 Administrator Interface 
4.3.1 Login as Administrator 
The PS Administrator is able to login to the Password Server from the 
System Administrator desktop where he/she is able to manage both User Main 
Accounts and Service Accounts. 
To login to the PS: 
• Select Password Server in the System menu 
• Select Login 
 
• The PS Login pop-up window is displayed 
• Insert user name in the Login field and relevant password  
• Click Login to access the PS 
• Click Cancel to abort the login operation 
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If login is successfully executed the PS Administrator Panel is displayed. 
4.3.1.1 Login Failure 
In some case the PS might refuse the user login. Various causes can 
prevent the user from logging in. 
Password Server component is unreachable 
In the case the Password Server is unreachable the user is notified and the 
Administrator is not able to open the Administrator Panel. 
User does not exist 
Either the User Name in the Login field is wrong or the relevant User 
Main Account has not been created in the repository. 
 
Password is wrong 
The password inserted does not correspond to the one stored in the 
repository's User Main Account. 
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User account has been disabled 
The account is not anymore accessible by the user. Only Administrator can 
re-enabled it. 
4.3.1.2 Logout 
To logout from PS Administration facility, 
• Select the Logout entry in the Password Server Menu. 
• A pop-up window request to confirm the operation 
• If Logout is confirmed, the PS Administration Panel is closed and 
the user is logged out from the Password Server administration. 
4.3.1.3 Forced Logout 
In case the Password Server goes down when the user is logged in, the 
session is terminated and the user is automatically logged out. The PS 
Administration panel is closed. 
4.3.1.4 Access the PS Administration Panel 
In the case the PS Administration Panel is closed but logout has not been 
performed, to re-open the panel, select Admin Panel in the Password Server 
menu. 
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4.3.1.5 Create a new User Main Account 
To add a new user into the Password Server repository from the PS 
Administration Panel: 
• Select the Account tab 
 
• Click Clear if you do not want to re-use any of the existing 
values. All the fields in the Details panel will be cleared (apart 
from the Role). 
• Insert the new User Name 
• Insert all the other desired data, apart from personal info all the 
fields are mandatory. 
• Click Add 
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A new User Main Account is created and it is displayed in the Account 
List 
This button ... Is Used to ... 
Add Add a new user in the Account List 
Del Delete a user in the Account List 
Apply Save the modifications done 
Clear Clear all the editable fields in the 
Account tab 
Close Close the Administrator Panel 
window 
 
Maximum User Name length is 32 characters. 
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4.3.1.6 Initial Default User 
The Password Server repository has a first initial default user stored. The 
user has the following default value: 
• Role: Administrator 
• User Name: "Administrator" 
• Password: "Administrator" 
Once logged in the Administrator must change the initial password in order 
to secure the account. 
The account should never be deleted unless other accounts with 
Administrator profile have been created. 
In any case it is recommended to create at least one additional 
Administrator user in order to have access to the repository in case of problems 
with the initial account (e.g. forgot the password). 
4.3.1.7 Migration Default User 
In order to perform the migration procedure a specific account must be first 
created by the Administrator with the following value: 
• Role: Administrator 
• User Name: "Migration" 
• Password: "Migration" 
• IdleTime: 365 
• Password Expiration: 365 
The account must not be accessed and values must not be changed. 
When the migration procedure has been performed by all the MMI Clients 
the account can be deleted. 
4.3.2 View and Modify an Existing User Account 
In order to access a User Main Account, Login as Administrator. 
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4.3.2.1 View a User Main Account 
• Select the Account tab 
• Select the desired User Name in the Account List pane 
 
• The Account tab displays the data associated with the selected User 
Name 
 
The following table sets out the meanings of the Account fields 
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This field... Means.... 
User Name User Name 
Password Password — not displayed in clear 
Confirm Password To be Set when changing the password 
for confirmation 
Role User role: either Trader or Administrator
Disabled The Account is disabled when ticked 
Max Bad Login The maximum number of possible 
unsuccessful login 
Bad Login Count Display the current number of 
unsuccessful logins performed by the user. 
Read Only 
Last Login Date and time of the latest login 
performed by the user 
Creation Date Date of account creation — Read Only 
Password 
Expiration 
Date of the expiration of the password —
Read Only 
Expiration Value Number of days, from last change, the 
password will expire 
Idle Time Maximum number of days the User 
Account can remain Idle, i.e. no login is 
performed 
Personal 
Information 
Free text field for inserting information
associated with the user 
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4.3.2.2 Change Password 
• View the desired User Main Account 
• Insert the new password in the field Password of the Account tab. 
• Insert the new password in the Confirm field for checking the new 
password 
• Click Apply 
The new password has to follow the organization defined Password Policy 
(e.g. minimum password length). See section Password Management Policy 
for details. 
Maximum password length is 32 characters. 
4.3.2.3 Set Password Expiration Time 
• View the desired User Account 
• Insert the Expiration Time field the desired value 
• Click Apply 
The value inserted in the field expresses the time in number of "days" 
from the date the password has been set. The value must be greater than 
zero and the resulting password expiration date must not be already passed. 
Default initial value is 30 days. 
4.3.2.4 Set Account Idle Time 
• View the desired User Account 
• Insert in the Idle Time field the desired value 
• Click Apply 
The value inserted in the field expresses the time in number of "days" 
from the Last Login date. The value must be greater than zero and the resulting 
account max idle date must not be already passed. 
Default initial value is 90 days. 
 
Chapter 4  User Guide 
 95
4.3.2.5 Set Max Login Failure Number 
• View the desired User Main Account 
• Insert in the Max Login Errors field the desired value 
The value inserted in the field expresses the maximum number of login 
failures accepted by the system before the account is disabled. 
The account can be re-enabled by the Administrator only. 
4.3.2.6 Enable/Disable a User Account 
• View the desired User Main Account 
• Tick the Enable/Disable check box 
• Click Apply 
When the check box is ticked the account is disabled and the user 
cannot access his/her account anymore. 
Note: User Name must not be changed. Use the Create new User Main 
Account procedure instead. 
 
4.3.3 Change Administrator Password 
The Administrator might be required to change his own password as the 
result of the following events: 
• The password is expired 
• The user is required to change the password at first login 
Administrator Users are able to change their own password at any time by 
accessing the relevant User Main Account (see Change Password section). 
 
4.3.4 Delete a User Account 
An Administrator is able to delete an existing User Main Account.  
• Select the desired User in the User List pane 
• Click the Del button 
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• Pop-up window requesting for confirmation is displayed  
• Click on OK (if you want to delete) 
Note: The initial default PS administrator user account named 
Administrator cannot be deleted. 
 
4.3.5 Create a Service Account 
An Administrator is able to create a Service Account associated with a 
User. 
• Select the desired User in the User Name list  
• Select the Services tab 
 
• Click Clear to clear the contents of current selection 
• Insert the new Service Name in the Service field 
 
• Insert the User Name in the User Name field 
• Insert service/market password in the Password field 
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• Insert password confirmation 
 
• Click Add 
• A new row in the Service list is added. 
 
Add new Service 
• Click on Close to exit from the PS Administration panel 
4.3.6 View and Modify a Service Account 
An Administrator is able to view and modify Services/Markets associated 
with the User. 
• Select the desired User in the User Name list 
• Select the Services tab 
• The list of Services/Markets associated with a User is displayed 
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• Select the desired Service Name in the service List 
• The relevant data are displayed in the Service Details pane 
• In case the Password need to be modified: 
• Insert service/market password in the Password field 
• Insert password confirmation in the Confirm Password field 
• Click Apply to update the repository. 
 
Add new Service 
4.3.7 Delete a Service Account 
An Administrator is able to delete a Service Account associated with a 
User. 
• Select the desired User in the User Name list 
• Select the Services tab 
• The list of Services/Markets associated with a User is displayed 
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• Select the desired Service Name in the service List 
• Click Delete 
• Pop-up window requesting for confirmation is displayed 
• The Service is removed from the Service List 
• Click on Close to exit from the PS Administration panel 
 
4.3.8 Defining Password Format Policy 
In order to define a Password Format Policy as specified in the section 
titled, Password Management Policy, the Administrator needs to define the 
appropriate settings in the mkv.init file. Accessing that file the Password 
Server will initialize the policy at start up. 
The policy, once defined, is applied to all User Main Accounts that will be 
created from the moment the Password Server has been configured 
accordingly. The policy cannot be changed on a per user basis. 
See the chapter Installing and Configuring the Password Server for the 
details on how configuring variables to define the Password Format Policy. 
In case no setting is defined in the configuration file, a default policy is 
applied with the following values: 
• Password minimum length is 6 chars 
• Minimum Number of Numeric chars is 1 
• Minimum Number of ASCII chars is 3 
• Password must be different from User Name is enabled 
In addition, the policy can be disabled, i.e. the checks on the password 
format are not performed, by setting to 0 the corresponding configuration 
variable. 
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4.3.9 Performing the Migration 
The migration is performed at the first MMI Client start up (see section 
"Migrating to The Password Server") after its successful installation. 
Note: before starting any MMI Client migration procedure a migration 
specific account must be created in the repository (see Migration Default 
User) and the Password Policy must be disabled (Defining Password 
Format Policy). 
When the MMI Client starts and detects the presence both of the Password 
server and of the password file pwd.mvi, and no migration has been already 
performed for that specific MMI client, the Trader user is requested to start 
the migration procedure. 
• The pop up window is displayed 
• Click on OK to start the migration procedure 
• A pop up window request to insert the user's password to authorize 
the migration 
• Insert Password 
• Click OK. The migration procedure is started. 
• Wait until the procedure is terminated 
• A pop up window notifying the migration is terminated is displayed 
In the case the procedure termites successfully the Trader user needs only 
to login to the MMI Client in order to access the PS and be able to perform 
auto-login to configured markets. 
In the case the procedure is terminated unsuccessfully the Trader is able to 
access the markets without accessing the PS. 
The User accounts are created in the PS repository with a set of default 
values for the fields not specified in the pwd.mvi file. 
In particular, the following fields have default value set: 
• Role, 
• Max Bad Login, 
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• Password Expiration 
• Idle time 
The field Role is set by default to Trader. 
The default values for the remaining fields are configured in the mkv.init 
file. See the relevant section for details. 
The following tables summarize the migration procedure. 
 
Migration to be Performed 
PS Password Local 
File 
Action 
Not Available Any No migration can be 
performed. The 
MMI Client connect to the 
platform 
and markets by using the local 
password file. 
Available Available The Migration Procedure is 
performed 
by using the data found in the 
local 
password file. 
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Available Not Available The Migration Procedure is 
performed 
but user account data are 
inserted 
directly by the Trader user 
during 
migration. See Initialization 
section. 
 
Migration Performed Successfully 
PS Password Local 
File 
Action 
Available Any case The MMI client connects to 
Password 
Server and auto-login to 
markets is 
available. 
Not Available Any case The MMI client cannot login to
Password Server. Manual login 
to 
markets only is allowed 
 
Note: the migration procedure shall be performed with the Password 
Format Policy disabled. Otherwise, the Password Server will refuse the User 
Main Account passwords already stored in the pwd.mvi file, which do not 
conform to the policy. Consequently, the migration of the specific account will 
fail. 
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4.3.9.1 Initialization 
In the case the local password file is not present, or never created, the 
Trader user is requested to initialize it by inserting User Names and passwords 
for both the User Main Account and service Accounts in the Login Details 
window (see Change User Account Password). Default values are used for the 
attributes that are not editable by Trader user. 
 
4.4 Installing and Configuring the Password 
Server 
This section describes how to install and configure the ION Password 
Server component. Actually the Password Server needs the following 
component to be installed: 
• Password Server 100 
• MMI Client 148 
• System 124 
In the following we refer to the installation of the Password Server 
component only. 
Please refer to the relevant Installation and Configuration guides for 
installation procedures of the other components. 
 
4.4.1 Operating System and Software Requirement 
The Password Server runs on the following operating systems: 
• Microsoft® Windows NT® 
• Microsoft Windows® 2000 
• Microsoft Windows XP® 
• Sun Solaris® Operating Environment Version 2.8 or later 
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• Linux® Version 2.6 or later 
The component requires the following additional software:  
• Tcl/Tk Version 8.4.7 
The component also requires the following additional files: 
Windows: 
mkvpwdsrv.exe Password Server executable 
mkv.init initialization file 
Solaris Operating System Environment and Linux: 
All Platforms: 
mkvpwdsrv Password Server executable 
mkv.init MarketView configuration file 
 
4.4.2 Configuring Account Repository 
The account repository is based on a set of files containing the accounting 
data. By default the files are placed under the directory: ./MkvDB 
If the files need to be created on a different directory starts the password 
Server with the following command; 
Solaris: 
> mkvpwdsrv -dir [path] 
 
4.4.3 Log files 
The path where the Password Server log files are stored in the file 
system is defined in the Password Server configuration file. If not defined, the 
file is stored in the default directory LOGS placed where the Password Server 
is started. 
 
4.4.4 Configuring mkv.init 
 
Chapter 4  User Guide 
 105
The mkv.in i t  file for the MarketView Password Server is stored in 
the working directory of the component. This file contains variables that enable 
the user to establish connections with the MarketView platform. 
 
There are two main groups of variables in the mkv.init  file, standard 
variables and -specific variables. 
 
4.4.4.1 Standard Variables 
For details of these variables, refer to TBD. 
4.4.4.2 Password Server Specific Variables 
Variable Description Default 
Value 
MKVPSUSEPOLICY 0 (or unset): no policy check will take place for 
Accounts 
1: policy check activated for Account 
1 
MKVPSMINLENGTH Password minimum length 6 
MKVPSMINASCII Minimum number of alphanumeric digits required 
in the password 
# (A-Z, a-z) 
3 
MKVPSMINNUMERIC Minimum number of numeric digits required in the 
password 
# (0-9) 
1 
MKVPSDIFFUSER 1: Password and Username must be different 
0: Password and Username may be equal 
1 
MKVFORCECHANGE 1: Force the change of the password at first login 
0: Do not force the password change at first login 
0 
MKVMAXBADLOGIN Maximum number of allowed wrong logins before 
disabling the account 
3 
MKVEXPTIME Number of days before password expiration after 
its change 
90 
MKVIDLETIME Number of days a User account can remain Idle 
before being disabled, i.e. no login performed 
90 
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